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Sex Discrimination in Pension Benefits in England 
and the United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the number of women in the work force increasing, the issue of discrimi-
nation in pension benefits is a growing concern in England and the United 
States.! England, however, specifically excludes death and retirement benefits 
from protection under its sex discrimination legislation. 2 The European Eco-
nomic Community,3 (EEC) to which England belongs, has not yet applied the 
principles of equality directly to occupational pension plans. 4 U.S. law, on the 
other hand, recognizes that an inconsistency exists when principles of equality in 
pay are not applied to retirement benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court has held in 
two recent decisions5 that pension plans must maintain equality for men and 
women in both contributions6 and benefits. 7 
Women now comprise a greater proportion of the work force in the United 
States and in England than they have at any time in the past.8 Almost twice as 
many women as men participate in pension plans in England. 9 Although tradi-
tionally men have been the sole supporters of their families, the combination of 
longer lives, younger marriages, smaller families, and financial necessity has 
1. In 1960, 39.5 percent of the women in Great Britain participated in the labor force. u.s. Bur. ot 
Labor Statistics, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23, 25 (Feb. 1983). By 1981, that number had risen to 46.6 
percent.Id. at 60. In 1960,37.7 percent of all U.S. women were employed and in 1981,52.1 percent 
were employed.Id. The importance of the number of working women to the issue of discrimination in 
pension plans becomes apparent when it is noted that $481.1 billion was invested in private pension 
funds in the United States in 1981. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83,330 (103rd 
ed.-1982). Similarly, the 100,000 occupational pension plans in Great Britain had assets of approxi~ 
mately 60 billion pounds in 1982. Dawes, Pensions and Insurance, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 388,388 (1982). 
2. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 6(1) and Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 6(4). 
3. The EEC is a union of European countries organized to promote the economic and social 
integration of those nations. 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 100 (1977). 
4. See, e.g., EEC Council Directive 7917/EEC: On the Progressive Implementation of the Principle of 
Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Matters of Social Security [hereinafter cited as Social Security 
Directive] OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 24) 6 (1979). 
5. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Arizona 
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. 
Ct. 3492 (1983). 
6. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717. 
7. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499. 
8. See supra note I. 
9. In 1981, 6,057,000 women participated in contributory and non-contributory retirement pen-
sions, compared to 3,286,000 men. ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS, No. 119, at 113 (1983). See 
generally EQUAL STATUS FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES, Cmd. No. 6599, at 
22 (1976). 
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created situations where many women are now required to work.lO As the 
English Secretary of State for Social Services has said, to have one group of 
workers treated differently from another group, in any respect, is no longer 
acceptable. 11 
While the principle of equality in pay for men and women has been accepted 
in England,12 it has not been applied to occupational pension plans. 13 Both the 
Equal Pay Act 14and the Sex Discrimination Act 15 specifically exclude death and 
retirement benefits from their coverage. English courts have strictly construed 
these exclusionary provisions of the sex discrimination legislation, permitting 
different treatment of men and women with regard to pensions. 16 In addition, 
employers are permitted to maintain different retirement ages for men and 
women workers. 17 
The English government, in enacting anti-discrimination legislation, did not 
extend the principles of equality to pension plans because of the difficulty in 
defining equal treatment. 18 One major problem in achieving equality is that 
women retire at a younger age than men do and thus receive smaller pensions. 19 
Parliament has not equalized retirement ages because of the anticipated cost to 
both the National Insurance Fund and supplementary pensions. 20 As one com-
mentator suggests, however, as long as retirement ages are different and 
gender-based mortality tables are used, true equality of benefits cannot be 
achieved. 21 
10. 889 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 511 (1975). 
11. 888 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1492 (1975). 
12. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41. 
13. Occupational pension plans are employer-created schemes providing benefits for qualifying 
workers on termination of service or on death or retirement. Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, § 51(3). 
These schemes include plans contributed to by employees, employers, or both. [d. at § 51(4)(a)(ii). 
14. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 6(1). The Act states: 
6(1) In so far as -
(a) the terms and conditions of a woman's employment are in any respect, affected by 
compliance with the law regulating the employment of women; or 
(b) any special treatment is accorded to women in connection with the birth or expected birth 
of a child; then to that extent the requirement of equal treatment for men and women as 
mentioned in section I (1) of this Act shaH not apply (but without prejudice to its operation as 
regards other matters), nor shaH that requirement extend to requiring equal treatment as 
regards term and conditions related to retirement, marriage or death or to any provision made 
in connection with retirement, marriage or death; and the requirements of section 3(4) of this 
Act shaH be subject to corresponding restrictions. 
15. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 6(4), states "Subsections (I)(b) and (2) do not apply to 
provisions in relation to death or retirement." 
16. See, e.g., Roberts v. Tate & Lyle Food Distribution Ltd. and Barber v. Guardian Royal Assurance 
Group, [l983)I.C.R. 521 [Employment Appeal Tribunal) [hereinafter cited as Roberts v. Tate & Lyle). 
17. Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, § 23. The statutory social security scheme establishes the 
retirement age for men at 65 and for women at 60. 
18. See, e.g., 800 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 740-42 (1970). 
19. 801 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1788 (1970). 
20. See, e.g., 905 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 545 (written answers) (1976). 
21. EHis & MorreH, Sex Discrimination in Pension Schemes: Has Community Law Changed The Rules1 11 
INDUS. LJ. 16, 27 (1982). 
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In contrast, the United States has addressed the issue of equality for men and 
women in pension plans. The U.S. Supreme Court found, in Arizona v. Norris,22 
that different treatment of pension benefits for men and for women is inconsis-
tent with equality of pay in employment, as required by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court reasoned that pension benefits are a form of 
wages, directly related to employment, and, therefore, must be distributed in a 
non-discriminatory manner. 24 
This comment compares the law on pension benefits in England and the 
United States, specifically focusing on the applications of that law to men and 
women workers. The author first discusses the English law in light of the Sex 
Discrimination Act and EEC law, with particular emphasis on judicial interpreta-
tions of existing legislative and EEC acts. The author then discusses the U.S. law 
and the Supreme Court's view that Title VII mandates equality in pensions. 
Finally, the responses of each country to the issue of discrimination against 
women in pension benefits are compared. This comparison will suggest that the 
U.S. response offers some solutions to the English problems with equality III 
pension benefits. 
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITIES 
A. Great Britain and the EEC 
Great Britain joined the EEC III 1973 by signing the Treaty of Accession,25 
thereby adopting the Treaty of Rome. 26 In an accompanying document, Great 
Britain agreed to bind itself to all earlier EEC decisions as well as to later ones. 27 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome,28 which requires equal pay for equal work, 
22. 103 S.Ct. 3492 (1983). 
23. Id. at 3498-3499. 
24. Id. at 3497 n.8. 
25. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, art. 2, 2 
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 7035 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Accession]. This treaty was signed on 
January 22, 1972, and became effective on January I, 1973. 
26. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, March 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
3,2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 7013. The signatories to this treaty (commonly known as the "Treaty 
of Rome") were Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.Id. See generally A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAw 9 (1973). The EEC is a union of European 
countries with its purpose being to "ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by 
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe .... " Treaty of Rome,supra, at Preamble. 
27. Treaty of Accession, supra note 25, at art. 2. In 1972, Great Britain enacted the European 
Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, which incorporated this principle into British law. 
28. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 119, states: 
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the applica-
tion of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. For the 
purpose of this article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any 
other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or 
indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer. Equal pay without discrimination 
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thus became part of English municipal law upon Great Britain's entry into the 
EEC.29 
1. The European Council and Directives 
The Treaty of Rome creates a council, consisting of representatives from 
member states,30 responsible for ensuring that the objectives of the treaty are 
attained.3! To fulfill this mission, the council issues various instruments necessary 
to implement EEC law,32 including directives that are binding on all members to 
whom the particular directive is addressed. 33 Because each member chooses its 
own method of implementing a directive, they have been used sparingly.34 In 
essence, they are orders from the council directing member states to conform 
their national legislation to the directive. 35 
The European Council has issued three directives dealing with equality of 
treatment for men and women. 36 The Equal Pay Directive implements the 
principle embodied in Article 119 of equal pay for equal work. 37 This directive, 
which applies to "all aspects and conditions of remuneration,"38 calls for the 
based on sex means: (a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis 
of the same unit of measurement; (b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the 
same job. 
29. Note, Sex Discrimination, Equal Pay and Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, 93 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 
499 (1977). 
30. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 145. 
31. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 35. 
32. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 189 states: 
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommen-
dations or deliver opinions. 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which 
it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 
See PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 61. 
33. See also Ellis & Morrell,supra note 21, at 16 n.9. "[A] directive is an order from the Community to 
member states to alter their internal laws so as to achieve a certain harmonized result." Jd. 
34. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 61-62. 
35. Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European Community, 14 LAW & POL'y 
INT'L Bus. 293, 296 (1982). Directives are used generally when uniformity is unnecessary or unanimity 
unattainable, or a standard rather than a procedure is being promulgated. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 
26, at n.61. An example is a standard of quality for the packaging of food. ld. 
36. EEC Council Directive 75/117, On the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating 
to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay For Men and Women, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 19) 45 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Equal Pay Directive]; EEC Council Directive 76/207, On the Implementa-
tion of the Principle of Equal Treatment For Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, 
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 40) 39 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Equal Treatment Directive]; and the Social Security Directive, supra note 4. 
37. Equal Pay Directive, supra note 36, at Preamble. 
38. Art. 1 states: 
The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Article 119 of the Treaty, 
hereinafter called 'principle of equal pay,' means, for the same work or for work to which equal 
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elimination of all discrimination on the basis of sex between workers performing 
the same work or work of equal value. 39 Pension schemes, however, were not 
included,<o and no court has applied the Equal Pay Directive to such plans.41 The 
Council stated explicitly that it would not include pensions in the Equal Treat-
ment Directive,4~ preferring to adopt specific provisions on equal treatment in 
social security schemes in a later directive. 43 
Specific provisions were issued two years later in the third directive, the Social 
Security Directive, which requires progressive implementation of equal treat-
ment principles to matters of social security.44 This directive applies to all aspects 
of social security legislation, including access to plans, obligations to contribute, 
calculations of contributions and benefits, and the duration of benefits. 45 The 
directive, however, allows member states to legislate certain exceptions46 to the 
equal treatment principle; for example, it need not apply to statutory retirement 
ages, benefits granted to parents or increases in long term benefits for a depen-
dent wife. 41 These exceptions, particularly the exclusion of retirement ages from 
coverage, limit the directive's scope and impact. 48 In addition, the Council has 
not yet issued a directive or other statement relating specifically to occupational 
pension schemes.49 
value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all 
aspects and conditions of remuneration. In particular, where ajob classification system is used 
for determining pay, it must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and so 
drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex. 
!d. at art. I. 
39. !d. 
40. Laurent. European Community Law and Equal Treatmentfor Men and Women in Social Security, 121 
INT'L LAB. REV. 373, 375 (1982). 
41. See, e.g., Worringham v. Lloyds Bank, [1981] 2 All E.R. 434, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 950 [E.C.J.J; 
Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1982] 2 All E.R. 402, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 918 [E.C.J.]. In both 
cases, the court found for the plaintiff on the basis of Article 119 and did not reach the issue of the 
Equal Pay Directive's applicability to member states. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
42. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 36, at art. 1, states: 
I. The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, 
and to vocational training and as regards working conditions and, on the conditions referred to 
in paragraph (2), social security. This principle is hereinafter referred to as 'the principle of 
equal treatment.' 
2. With a view to ensuring the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment in matters of social security, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, will 
adopt provisions defining its substance, its scope, and the arrangements for its application. 
43. Id. at art. 1(2). See Laurent, supra note 40, at 375 (stating the Council's decision to wait for a future 
directive on social security). 
44. Social Security Directive, supra note 4, at art. 1. This article became effective in December, 1984. 
See Laurent, supra note 40, at 375. 
45. Laurent, supra note 40, at 377-78 (discussing article 4 of the Social Security Directive). 
46. !d. at 378. 
47. Social Security Directive, supra note 4, at art. 7. See Laurent, supra note 40, at 378. 
48. Laurent, supra note 40, at 378. 
49. Article 3(3) of the Social Security Directive states that the Council will produce legislation on 
occupational schemes in the future. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 17. 
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2. The European Court of Justice 
While the Council issues directives necessary to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome, it is the role of the European Court of Justice to interpret 
and enforce EEC law.50 The court will only address issues covered by EEC law 
and will not address national concerns. 51 It has jurisdiction to make preliminary 
rulings on interpretations of the treaty and on acts of EEC institutions. 52 Any 
domestic court, but no individual, may refer a question to the Court of Justice if 
it concerns an issue of EEC law that is necessary to a judgment of that domestic 
court. 53 In practice, this means that, prior to judgment, a domestic court may stay 
the proceedings pending an interpretative decision by the Court of Justice on the 
EEC law in question. 54 The domestic judge alone decides if the issue involving 
EEC law is necessary to the decision.55 If a controverted and pertinent issue of 
EEC law is raised before a court of last resort, however, that court must refer the 
issue to the European court. 56 
3. Applicability of EEC Law In Member States 
Although EEC law has supremacy over nationallaw,57 not all Treaty of Rome 
provisions are directly applicable to member states. 58 A directly applicable Treaty 
50. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 165. The Court consists of eleven independent judges who 
possess the qualifications necessary to be appointed to the highest judicial post in their own countries. 
PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 71. The Court is assisted by five advocate-generals, whose role is to 
assist the judges by offering independent and impartial opinions on the cases before the Court. Note, 
Sex Discrimination: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court of justice, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 
624 n.16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sex Discrimination]. These opinions are not binding on the 
court, but are influential in the court's decision-making process. They are published to aid in under-
standing the Court's decisions. Id. 
51. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 126. 
52. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 177. 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
Where such a questions is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is 
raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice. 
See PARRV & HARDY, supra note 26, at 119, for a discussion of referrals to the Court of Justice. See also 
Note, Sex Discrimination, supra note 50, at 624 note 15 (discussing the purpose of article 177). 
53. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 177. See PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 124-25. 
54. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 119. 
55. Id. at 126. 
56. [d. at 124-25. In Great Britain, both the Court of Appeals and the House of Lords are courts of 
last resort. 
57. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 16. 
58. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26, at 142-43. See also Jensen v. Corp. of Trinity House, [1982] 2 
C.M.L. REV. 193, which discusses direct applicability of provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 
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article or EEC act is one that has immediate force of law in the member states 
without the need for enabling legislation, giving individuals enforceable rights 
that may be brought before domestic courtS.59 The Court of Justice has adopted 
the rule that in order for EEC law to be directly applicable, it must be capable of 
being given immediate effect by a municipal court without the need for either 
EEC or national enabling legislation regarding implementation or explanation 
of terms. 60 
The Court of Justice has held that the equal treatment provisions in Article 
119 are directly applicable in the member states as enforceable law when dis-
crimination can be determined solely on the basis of equal work and equal pay, as 
described in the Article, without the use or need of any further legislation. 6 ! 
Individuals may rely on the principle of equal pay in cases before national courts 
where the discrimination arises directly from legislative provisions, collective 
bargaining agreements, or individual employment contracts.6~ But protection 
from indirect or disguised discrimination requires specific EEC or national 
legislation.63 Indirect discrimination occurs when an employment practice, re-
gardless of intent, has an unjustifiable discriminatory effect on persons of one 
sex. An example of indirect discrimination is an employer setting a height 
requirement that most women cannot meet but that is unrelated to job perfor-
mance. 64 
Neither the Council nor the Court of Justice have applied the principles of 
equality, as stated in Article 119 and the supplementary directives, to occupa-
tional pension plans. The court has said that directives of the European Council 
can be directly effective against member states. 65 It has not ruled, however, on 
whether the Equal Payor the Equal Treatment Directives are directly applica-
ble. 66 In addition, the court has not resolved the issue of whether a directive can 
be enforced by one individual against another individual or a private employer. 67 
59. PARRY & HARDY, supra note 26. at 142. See also Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 21. Rights created 
by a directly applicable treaty provision are vested in individuals and enforceable in national courts. 
Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43175. (1976) E.C.R. 455, (1976) I.C.R. 547, 568 [E.C.].). Courts use the 
phrase "directly effective" as a term of art meaning "directly applicable." The two phrases are used 
interchangeably in this Comment. See, e.g., Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., (1982)2 All E.R. 
402, 412. 
60. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 21. 
61. Defrenne v. Sabena, (1976) I.C.R. at 566-68. 
62. [d. See McCallum & Snaith, EEC Law and United Kingdom Occupational Pension Schemes, 2 EUR. L. 
REV. 266, 269 (1977). 
63. Defrenne v. Sabena, (1976) I.C.R. at 566. See Laurent, supra note 40, at 382 (discussion of the 
rulings of the Court of Justice on article 119). 
64. 889 PARL. DEB., supra note 10, at 513-14. 
65. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 24 (citing Publico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78 (1979) E.C.R. 
1629). 
66. Snaith, European Community, The Common Market: Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination, 7 EUR. L. REV. 
301 (1982). See also Note, Equal Pay in the European Court, 45 MOD. L. REV. 81 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Equal Pay). 
67. Hugh-Jones v. St. John's College, Cambridge, (1979) I.C.R. 848,858. See alw Ellis & Morrell, 
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B . National Law 
The English Parliament has enacted legislation that prohibits unequal treat-
ment of persons on the basis of sex, particularly in the area of employment. 6H 
This principle of equality has not been applied, however, to death or retirement 
benefits.69 Pension benefits are treated differently than other employment be-
nefits received by English workers. 
1. Provisions for Retirement Benefits 
All workers in England must contribute to the state social security system 70 
until they retire, which is for men normally at sixty-five and for women at sixty, 
as established by statute.71 No English government has introduced legislation to 
equalize retirement ages because of the anticipated difficulties and costS.72 Low-
ering the male retirement age to sixty, with the resulting lower pension and 
greater number of non-working years, is considered undesirable by critics.73 Yet, 
since women have been contributing to the plan with the expectation of retiring 
at age sixty, critics argue, it would be unfair to raise their age requirement. 74 
In 1982, over 11.8 million of the 22.8 million workers in Great Britain partici-
pated in an occupational pension plan in addition to the state social security 
supra note 21, at 24. Directives should be directly applicable to employers (and other non-state parties) 
as a means of supplementing article 119. Otherwise, employers would be required to treat men and 
women equally with regard to the amounts they are paid but would not be required to treat them 
equally with respect to other terms of employment, such as vacation time. [d. Ellis & Morrell note, 
however, that because directives are not published in the Communities' Official Journal, it would be 
unfair to apply law that employers could not readily discover. [d. at 24-25. Therefore, even if the court 
finds either directive applicable to occupational pension plans, it is not clear that individuals would be 
able to enforce the rights created thereunder against private employers. [d. 
68. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65. 
69. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 6(1); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 6(4). 
70. Dawes, supra note I, at 388. The weekly pension, which the worker receives after retirement, 
consists of a flat rate component and an additional, variable, earnings-related component based on the 
worker's twenty best earning years. Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60, § 6(1), (2). See 888 PARL. 
DEB., supra note II, at 1488-90 (explaining 1975 changes in the social security system). Social security 
pensions are paid by the National Insurance Fund by contributions collected from earners, employers, 
and the government. Wcmingham, [1981] I.C.R. 558, 562 [E.C.J.] (opinion of Advocate-General 
Warner). The earnings-related component is directly related to the amount the employee and employer 
contribute. The more money a worker makes, the more is contributed, and, therefore, the greater the 
pension at retirement. [d. 
71. Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, § 23. The disparity in retirement ages is justified by the 
government with the following reasons: "(a) the average age disparity between husbands and wives; (b) 
the fact that women often have, in effect, two jobs - running a home and going out to work; (c) 
reduced working efficiency of women in their sixties; and (d) women's greater proneness to ill-health." 
CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 47. The Occupational Pensions Board found that some, if not all, of the 
above reasons will apply more frequently to men as time goes on. ld. at 52. 
72. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 28. See also, e.g., 905 PARL. DEB., supra note 20, at 544, 545. 
Lowering the retirement age of men would result in higher costs, due to the longer period of retirement 
in which men would collect pension benefits. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 25. 
73. ld. at 27. 
74. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at xv. 
1985] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION BENEFITS 439 
system. 75 While the terms of these plans, which are designed to supplement 
retirement benefits received from the security system, are not prescribed by 
law/6 the state does regulate the full content of these plans. 77 Each occupational 
pension plan must fulfill the following criteria: it must be established under an 
irrevocable trust; the employer must contribute some money to the fund; both 
employer and employee must recognize the plan; and the benefits may not 
exceed certain levels. 7~ In addition, the Social Security Pensions Act of 1975 
requires equal access to any plan for both men and women. 79 The plan must also 
be certified by the Occupational Pensions Board,~o which is authorized to ap-
prove requirements for the preservation of and equal access to these schemes. HI 
Occupational pension plans are closely linked to the state system.~2 Most 
employers who provide an occupational pension scheme follow the state's exam-
ple by setting the retirement age of women five years younger than that of male 
employeesY Moreover, if the Occupational Pensions Board permits, members of 
an occupational pension plan may decline to participate in the earnings-related 
component of the state social security system. H4 Employees may do so if the 
Board issues a certificate for the plan and if the private pension plan provides 
earnings-related benefits between the state minimum level and the upper limit 
on benefits. H.; At a minimum, however, employees must receive the same amount 
of benefits as they would have had they remained in the state scheme.~6 
75. Dawes. supra note 1, at 388. See supra note 13 (defining occupational pension plans). 
76. Laurent, supra note 40, at 380. Occupational schemes sometimes also cover sickness, unemploy-
ment, invalidity, or death. Id. 
77. See Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, Part II, §§ 64-67, as amended by Social Security Pensions 
Act, 1975, ch. 60, Part IV, §§ 53-59. 
78. Dawes, supra note 1, at 389. See generally Finance Act, 1970, ch. 24 (Part II, ch. II). 
79. Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60 § 53. The act states that membership in a plan must be 
"open to both men and women on terms which are the same as to the age and length of service needed 
for becoming a member and as to whether membership is voluntary or obligatory." /d. 
80. Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, § 51. The Occupational Pensions Board was established by 
section 66 of the 1973 act. See Schedule 17 of the Social Security Act, 1973 for a description of the 
Board. 
81. Dawes, supra note 1, at 389. 
82. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 19. 
83. CMU. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 17. Even when an employer sets the same retirement age for men 
and women, the employee's retirement decision will often reRect the state pension age, to maximize 
benefits from both plans. See Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 27. Nonetheless, some of the large 
schemes have set the same pension ages for men and women. CMU. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 13. 
84. Worringham, [1981) I. C. R. at 562 (opinion of Ad vocate-General Warner). Workers and em players 
agree to this arrangement, generally referred to as "contracting-out," because they then pay reduced 
rates of contribution to the state system. Members receive their earnings-related component from the 
pension scheme and, therefore, are eligible only for the basic component from the state pension. Id. 
85. CMU. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 15. Certificates are issued if the scheme fulfills the requirements 
of the Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60, §§ 30-41. WOT1ingham, [1981) I.C.R. at 562. Other 
requirements for "contracting-out" under the Social Security Pensions Act, 1975 include: provision of 
benefits for widows; transference of accrued pension rights for members who leave the employer's 
service prior to retirement; and rules governing the surrender of pensions. Id. 
86. CMU. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 15. This is known as a guaranteed minimum pension, and it must 
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2. Inequalities in Occupational Pension Plans 
The rate of benefits under any private pension plan must be the same for men 
and women if they have the same earnings records.87 Women, however, actually 
receive lower benefit payments than men, because women earn their pensions 
over a shorter period of time due to their earlier retirements.88 In addition, the 
cost of benefits to women is greater because, according to statistics, women live 
longer than men.89 Insurance companies therefore use different mortality tables 
for men and women in order to calculate the costs accurately and to determine 
the periodic benefits a pensioner is entitled to receive.90 The result is lower 
benefit payments to women since, on the average, women will receive them for a 
longer period of time. 91 
Inequalities in pension benefits exist because women on the average earn less 
than men;92 therefore, benefits based on earnings will be lower. Frequently, 
businesses that mainly employ female workers do not offer occupational pension 
plans.93 In addition, pension schemes in Great Britain generally have different 
provisions for male and female workers regarding availability of dependents' 
benefits and the means by which pensions can be committed or allocated.94 
Parliament eliminated one source of discrimination by requiring all private 
pension plans to be equally accessible to both men and women.95 At present, 
however, women in Great Britain generally receive smaller pensions on retire-
ment from their occupational pension schemes than do their male colleagues.96 
3. Legislation Against Sex Discrimination in England 
England has enacted legislation to eliminate certain types of discrimination 
against women, covering conditions and terms of employment and including the 
accrue usually at a minimum rate of 1I80th of pensionable earnings for each year of contracted-out 
employment. [d. at 16. 
87. /d. at 16. 
88. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 25-26. This is true even when they have been working their 
entire adult lives and have not taken time for child-rearing. [d. 
89. CMO. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 18-19. 
90. [d. at 16. Benefits are calculated based on the period over which the pension is likely to be paid. 
/d. Controversy over the use of gender-based mortality tables, which existed in the United States, has 
not yet occurred in Great Britain, probably because the fundamental question of whether to apply 
equality principles to pension plans has not yet been decided. 
91. CMO. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 62. 
92. Laurent, supra note 40, at 376. 
93. [d. at 380. 
94. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 15. Many occupational pension plans provide for a widow, but 
not for a widower. Plans that have contracted-out of the state system are required only to provide 
widow's benefits. Many schemes also allow for commutation (reduced pension in return for a lump sum) 
or for allocation of a portion of the pension to the pensioner's dependents. These terms are generally 
different for male and female pensioners. [d. at 25-26. 
95. Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60 § 53. This provision became effective in 1978. See CMO. 
No. 6599, supra note 9, at 82-100 (discussing the equal access requirements). 
96. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 25-26. 
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right to equal compensation.97 Employers must pay their workers equal amounts 
for equal work. 98 But no such requirement exists with regard to pension benefits, 
which are future compensation for present work. 
a. The Equal Pay Act 1970 
The Equal Pay Act prohibits discrimination against women in compensation, 
when male and female workers are engaged in the same place of employment 
and doing the same or similar work. 99 Actions brought under this Act are heard 
solely by the tribunal system, which has considerable power to order adjustments 
in pay and working conditions if the allegations are proven to be true. 100 In order 
to achieve its goals, the Act requires that every employment contract concluded 
with women must have an equality clause; 101 if it does not have one, such a clause 
is implied by law into the contract. 102 An equality clause provides that if a 
woman's contract has a less favorable term than a man's contract or is lacking a 
favorable term altogether, the contracts will be treated as if both had the same 
favorable condition. 103 
The requirement of an equality clause is limited, however, by the provision in 
the Equal Pay Act exempting those discriminatory contracts that the employer 
can prove are the result of genuine, material differences other than sex. 104 The 
provision is intended to cover establishments that base compensation on length 
97. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 (in part amending the Equal 
Pay Act). 
98. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41. Section I of the Act states: 
[F]or men and women employed on like work the terms and conditions of one sex are not in 
any respect less favorable then those of the other; and (b) for men and women employed on 
work rated as equivalent (within the meaning of subsection (5) below) the terms and conditions 
of one sex are not less favorable than those of the other in any respect in which the terms and 
conditions of both are determined by the rating of their work. 
99. Id. at § 1(1). See Note, Sex Equality and the Law in Britain, 5 BRIT. J. L. & SOC'Y 148, 149 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Sex Equality] (discussion of the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act 
and their impact as of 1978). 
100. Note, Sex Equality, supra note 99. at 149. Section 2 of the Equal Pay Act gives industrial tribunals 
initial jurisdiction to hear claims of discrimination in employment. Complaints, initiated by written 
"originating applications," are brought before tribunals consisting of a lawyer chairperson and two lay 
members with knowledge or experience in industry. Covington, American and British Employment Dis-
crimination Law: An Introductory Comparative Survey, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 369 (1977). Legal 
issues are appealable to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), which also consists of lawyers and lay 
persons with special knowledge of industrial relations. Id. From there, appeals of issues of law may be 
had to the Court of Appeals by leave only. Id. at 370. The Court of Appeals may grant a party leave to 
appeal to the House of Lords, or that body may on its own decide to hear the case. PARRY & HARDY, 
supra note 26, at 126. The tribunal system was created to be an informal part of the judiciary, 
"adjudication being made by those with actual experience of the industrial field." Note, Sex Equality, 
supra note 99, at 156. 
101. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § I (2), as amended by the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 8. 
102. /d. 
103. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § 1(2) as amended by the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 § 8. 
104. Id. at § 1(3). Cj. U.S. Equal Pay Act, of 1963, 29 u.s.c. § 206(d). See infra notes 262-65 and 
accompanying text. 
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of service, level of output, or quality of performance. lOS The Equal Pay Act is 
further limited since it excludes from the requirement of equality any terms and 
conditions of employment relating to death or retirement. 106 
The government was reluctant to include pensions within the coverage of the 
Equal Pay Act because of the problems of defining equality in private pension 
plans. 107 While employers argue that equality in pension schemes means the cost 
to the employer of providing the plans, employees contend that equality is the 
contribution made by employees and the resulting benefits. 108 One commentator 
noted that the additional problem of different retirement ages for men and 
women makes it impractical to achieve equality in private occupational plans 
until equality is attained at the state level. 109 
b. Sex Discrimination Act J 975 
The Equal Pay Act, which only became fully enforceable in 1975, was 
amended in that year by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 110 Prohibitions against 
sex discrimination were expanded to cover not only non-compensatory areas of 
employment, including training, but also education, housing, and the provision 
of goods, facilities, and services. l11 It is now unlawful for employers to discrimi-
nate in any respect on the basis of sex,112 unless a statutorily defined bona fide 
105. Note, Sex Equality, supra note 99, at 150. 
106. Equal Pay Act, ch. 41, § 6(1). Also excluded from the requirement are "retirement, whether 
voluntary or not, on grounds of age, length of service or incapacity," id. at § 6(2), and special provisions 
concerning maternity. Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, § 6(4), modifies this section to include provisions 
concerning marriage within the Act's coverage. See Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, § 3. See also infra 
notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 
107. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 10 (citing SOO PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 736-74 (1970». The 
parliament debate over this Act included a discussion of an amendment to the Act deleting the 
exclusion for pensions, which was later withdrawn. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 10. 
lOS. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 26. 
109. [d. at 27. Equalizing ages at which workers are eligible for their occupational pensions, without a 
corresponding change in the state system, would result in undue hardship. Workers eligible to receive 
their private pensions five years before receiving their social security benefits might find it difficult to 
live on just their private pension benefits. [d. 
110. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65. 
111. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 5. The statute covers both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, Part I, states in part: 
1-(i) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purpose of 
any provision of this Act if - (a) on the ground if he treats her less favorably than he treats or 
would treat a man, or (b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or 
would apply equally to a man but (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the 
sex of the person to whom it is applied, and (iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot 
comply with it. 
The Act specifically provides that it shall be read so as to require equal treatment of men as well as 
women. [d. at § 2(1). 
112. [d. at § 6. This act covers all employers with more than five employees, employer associations, 
trade unions, partnerships of six members or more, employment agencies, and vocational training 
bodies. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 6. 
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occupational qualification exists. 113 Such a qualification exists when members of 
one sex cannot fulfill the requirement for a particular job because there is a 
genuine occupational qualification requiring members only of the other sex. 114 
Complaints brought under the Sex Discrimination Act are heard by industrial 
tribunals if the complaints concern employment, and by county courts for 
allegations relating to other parts of the act. 115 In addition, the act created the 
Employment Opportunities Commission ("EOC"), which was given authority to 
conduct investigations into any area covered by both the Equal Pay Act and the 
Sex Discrimination Act. 116 While the EOC is responsible for bringing actions on 
behalf of groups, individuals may bring suit under the act to redress their own 
grievances. 117 The EOC is empowered to assist individual complainants and is 
kept informed by the tribunals of all such proceedings. 118 The EOC is also 
required to attempt conciliation when requested to do so by a party or if it 
considers success possible. 119 
One commentator has charged that, aside from the equal access require-
ments,120 women are afforded no protection from discrimination in the area of 
pension plans under the British statutory scheme. 121 The Sex Discrimination Act, 
like the Equal Pay Act, excludes death and retirement benefits from the general 
prohibition against discrimination. 122 In addition, the Act provides a general 
exception for the insurance industry when discrimination is based on reliable 
actuarial data. 123 Because the Sex Discrimination Act was already lengthy and 
113. Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, § 7. 
114. /d. 
115. See supra note 100 for an explanation of the tribunal system. When discrimination is found, an 
industrial tribunal may grant relief by: (I) issuing an order declaring the rights of the parties con-
cerned; (2) ordering the respondent to pay damages; or (3) making recommendations for action to 
obviate or reduce the adverse effects of the discrimination in question. Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, § 
65(1). Injuries to feelings are considered when granting relief. [d. at § 66(4). Section 65(2) limits 
compensation to an amount not to exceed the amount stated in the Trade Union and Labor Relations 
Act, 1974, ch. 52, &hedule I, ~ 20(l)(b), which is presently listed as 5,200 pounds. A respondent, 
however, can avoid paying damages if he can prove there was no intent to discriminate. Sex Discrimina-
tion Act, ch. 65, § 66(3). Damage awards are limited to the two years preceding the date on which 
proceedings under the equal pay clause are instituted. Equal Pay Act, ch. 41, § 2(5). 
116. [d. at § 57. See also Note, Sex Equality, supra note 99, at 158. The EOC may issue nondiscrimina-
tion notices if it finds a violation of the act. Failing voluntary compliance, the EOC may then enforce its 
order in the courts. [d. at §§ 67-73. 
117. [d. at § 63. 
118. [d. at §§ 74-75. 
119. [d. at § 64. 
120. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
121. Note, Equal Pay Pensions and European Law, 97 L.Q. REV. 357, 357 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Pensions and European Law]. 
122. Ch. 65, § 6(4). 
123. Sex Discrimination Act, ch. 65, § 45, states: 
Nothing in Parts II [Employment] to IV shall render unlawful the treatment of a person in 
relation to an annuity, life insurance policy, accident insurance policy, or similar matter 
involving the assessment of risk, where the treatment - (a) was effected by reference to 
actuarial or other data from a source on which it was reasonable to rely, and (b) was reasonable 
having regard to the data of any other relevant factors. 
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complex, the House of Lords continued the pension exclusion rather than 
complicate the statute. 124 Parliament delayed further action until the Occupa-
tional Pensions Board could produce its report on equality for women in occupa-
tional schemesY5 As of January 1985, Parliament had not taken any further 
action on the issue of equality in occupational pension plans, leaving it to the 
courts for further consideration. 
C. Judicial Interpretation of English and EEC Legislation 
l. State Social Security Schemes Under Article 119 
Since under English law, pension benefits have been excluded from anti-
discrimination legislation, plaintiffs argue that pension benefits constitute pay 
within the concept of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and therefore fall under 
EEC law. 126 The problem with this argument, however, is in the interpretation of 
the term pay as used in Article 119. 127 Article 119 defines remuneration as "the 
ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether 
in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of 
his employment from his employer."128 The Court of Justice, in Defrenne v. 
Belgium State, 129 interpreted this language to exclude statutory social security 
schemes. 130 
The plaintiff in Defrenne, an airline hostess, claimed that she was ~ubjected to 
discrimination in violation of Article 119 because the state excluded female 
airline hostesses from its social security system, but not male stewards who were 
engaged in the same work. 131 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court did not 
say that all pension benefits are beyond the scope of pay as defined by Article 
119. 132 Rather, it held that benefits from state-supplied social security plans 
"which are directly regulated by law and not the result of any element of 
agreement within the enterprise or occupational group, and that apply to gen-
eral categories of employees" are not remuneration under the Treaty.133 Em-
ployers contribute to the financing of statutory social security schemes in com-
124. 362 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 184 (1975). 
125. CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 10. 
126. Note, Equal Pay, supra note 66, at 83. Article 119 was inserted into the Treaty of Rome for two 
reasons: the social policy for ensuring that all workers receive equal pay for equal work and the 
economic goal of preventing some countries from gaining a competitive advantage by employing female 
workers at a lower rate of pay. McCallum & Snaith, supra note 62, at 266-67. 
127. Laurent, supra note 40, at 373. 
128. Treaty of Rome, supra note 26, at art. 119. 
129. Defrenne v. Belgium State (Recueil Vol. XVIII, 1971-74, p. 445) [1971-1973 Transfer Binder) 
COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) If 8137, at 7563. 
130. /d. at 7568. See McCallum & Snaith, supra note 62, at 267. 
131. DefTenne v. Belgium State, COMMON MKT. REP. If 8137, at 7563. 
132. /d. at 7567. 
133. /d. 
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pliance with social policies established by the state. 134 This does not constitute 
direct or indirect pay to a worker because the employee receives benefits merely 
by fulfilling conditions set by law, rather than as a result of the employment 
relationship.135 The court concluded that state pension benefits were not 
emoluments indirectly paid and therefore EEC law did not apply to this case. 136 
As a result, the state social security system was exempt from compliance with the 
equality principles enunciated in Article 119. 137 
2. Contribution to a Private Pension Plan as Pay Within Article 119: 
Worringham v. Lloyds' Bank 
Soon after Defrenne v. Belgium State, the English court had an opportunity to 
resolve the conflict between the Article 119 principle of pay equality for men and 
women and the inequality in private pension plans in Worringham v. Lloyds' 
Bank. 13s Lloyds' Bank maintained two compulsory contracted-out retirement 
benefit schemes, one for men and one for women. 139 Both schemes required 
employees to contribute five percent of their salary, which was deducted by the 
bank and paid to the trustees of the pension plan. 140 The plans differed in that 
men were required to contribute when first hired whereas women under age of 
twenty-five were not required to participate in the plan. 141 In order for the 
take-home pay of all bank employees in Great Britain to be the same,142 Lloyds 
paid all its employees, except women under twenty-five, five percent more than 
134. Id. 
135. Id. See McCallum & Snaith,supra note 62, at 267 (reviewing EEC law in relation to pensions as of 
1977). 
136. Dtifrenne v. Belgium State, COMMON MKT. REp. 11 8136, at 7567. While the court did not reach the 
issue, Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe did suggest that occupational pension plans that are 
separate from the state scheme would be covered by article 119. Id. at 7575. 
137. [d. at 7568. 
138. Worringham v. L1oyds' Bank, [1979)I.C.R. 174 [E.A.T.); [1981)1 W.L.R. 950 [E.C.J.); [1982)3 
All E.R. 373 (Ct. App.). See Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 17-22. 
139. Woningham, [1981)1 W.L.R. at 952. The plans are the result of collective bargaining between 
the bank and the union. The national authorities approved and certified the scheme as a contracted-out 
plan. /d. at 966. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text for description of contracted-out 
retirement plans. 
140. Womngham, [1981) I.C.R. at 560 (opinion of Advocate-General Warner). To qualify for be-
nefits, an employee must have been with the bank for at least five years and have reached the age of 26. 
Employees who left before this point were allowed to transfer their rights to another scheme or to the 
state system. [d. at 562. 
141. 1 W.L.R. at 967. Neither the women under 25 nor the bank contributed to the plan; therefore, 
if they left before age 25, the women received nothing from the plan. Womngham, [1981]I.C.R. at 562 
(opinion of Advocate-General Warner). 
142. The Joint Negotiating Council for Banking set the salary scales of all clearing bank employees, 
including L1oyds' Bank workers. Womngham, [1981)I.C.R. at 560. That body recommended that salary 
scales be adjusted for employees participating in a contributory pension scheme to achieve equality in 
take home pay of all bank employees. [d. at 561. L1oyds' Bank was the only one of four major banks to 
operate a contributory scheme. [d. 
446 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
the other national banks.143 These payments were immediately deducted and 
contributed to the pension scheme. 144 The result was higher gross pay for men 
under twenty-five, with a corresponding increase in financial advantages and 
benefits. 145 The take-home pay was the same for both sexes. 146 
The plaintiffs, two women who had left the bank before they were twenty-five 
years old, complained to an industrial tribunal, claiming that equality clauses 
implied in their contracts by virtue of section 1 (2)(a) of the Equal Pay Act entitled 
them to five percent more gross salary.147 The industrial tribunal rejected the 
claim on the basis of the pension exclusion provision in the Equal Pay Act. 14M The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed on the ground that the pension exclu-
sion covers only terms relating to pensions; here the inequality related to a term 
of gross pay to which the equality clause applied. 149 Shortly thereafter, the Court 
of Appeal held that the words "provisions in relation to death or retirement" in 
the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 must be read broadly to mean any provision 
about death or retirement. 150 Plaintiffs' counsel was therefore forced to concede 
that Equal Pay Act Section 6(1) must be given the same broad meaning as Section 
6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act, thereby negating the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal's earlier holding. 151 On review to the court of appeal, plaintiffs turned 
to EEC law for support. 152 
Unable to agree on the effect of EEC law, the Court of Appeal referred the 
case to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to 
Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. lo3 The English court sought a ruling on 
whether Community law requiring equal treatment applies to employer-
provided pension schemes. 154 The Court of Justice narrowed the issue, however, 
to whether Lioyds payment to male employees under age twenty-six was com-
143. Id. at 561. 
144. Id. at 560. 
145. 1 W.L.R. at 967. Gross salary is used in calculating, for example, redundancy payments, 
unemployment benefits and allowances, and credit facilities. Id. 
146. [19SI]I.C.R. at 561. 
147. I W.L.R. at 966. 
14S. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at IS. 
149. Worringham, [1979]I.C.R., at ISO [E.A.T.]. The tribunal held that terms relating to pay are 
different from terms relating to pensions. It therefore did not need to reach the issue of whether 
community law applies because its decision is consistent with the EEC's equality of pay principles. Id. at 
lSI. 
150. Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority, Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., Mac-
Gregor Wallcoverings, Ltd. v. Turten, [1979]I.C.R. 55S, 564 (Ct. App.) [hereinafter cited as Roberts v. 
Cleveland]. See infra notes 173-S5 and accompanying text. 
151. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 19. Thus, any term relating to pensions, regardless of whether 
it also relates to pay, is excluded under § 6(4). Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Won1ngham, [19SI] 1 W.L.R. at 951. Seesupra note 52 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
article 177. 
154.Id. 
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pensation within the meaning of Article 119.155 The court held that sums of 
money that are included in gross income and used in calculating additional 
benefits constitute part of a worker's pay under paragraph 2 of Article 119, 
despite an immediate reduction and contribution to the pension plan. 156 By 
making contributions for male workers only, the employer violated the equal pay 
requirement for the Treaty of Rome. 157 In limiting its decision to the specific 
facts in question, the court was able to avoid answering the broader question of 
whether Article 119 applies to all facets of private pension schemes.15s Moreover, 
the court found that the Equal Pay Directive l59 adds nothing to the meaning of 
pay and therefore had no impact on this case. 160 
The Court of Appeal raised the broader issue of equality in pension plans, 
which Advocate-General Warner also addressed in his opinion. This issue, how-
ever, was not settled by the Court of Justice's decision. 161 Advocate-General 
Warner took the position in Worringham that while some private pension plans 
are covered by Article 119, Lioyds' plan and many other English schemes are 
not. 16Z Like many occupational pension plans, Lioyds' plan is linked to the state 
system through the contracting-out provision. 163 If Lioyds' plan fell within Article 
119, an anomaly would exist whereby the state would have to ensure equal rights 
for men and women in a contracted-out scheme, but would have no correspond-
ing obligation in its own system. 164 Warner suggested that when a plan is used as 
a substitute for the state scheme, rather than as a supplement like the 
155. Id. at 968. See Chrisham, The Equal Pay Principle: Some Recent Decisions of The European Court of 
justice, 18 C.M.L. REV. 601, 607 (1981) (discussing the European Court's rephrasing of the Court of 
Appeal's referral questions). 
156. Worringham, [1981] I W.L.R. at 968. 
157. Id. 
158. /d. See Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 21, for a discussion of the court's rephrasing of the 
referral questions and its avoidance of the more fundamental question of how to achieve equality in 
pension benefits. 
159. Equal Pay Directive, supra note 36. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. The court does 
not discuss the Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 35, in its decision. Advocate-General Warner 
points out, however, that the Directive was not effective when this litigation began and therefore should 
not apply. Worringham, [1981] I.C.R. at 570. 
160. Worringham, [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 969. The European Court affirmed its earlier decision in 
Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] I.C.R. 547 [E.C.].] in which it held that article 119 is directly effective against 
all discrimination that can be identified solely by the principles of equal pay and equal work. In 
Worringham, the employer's payment to a pension plan for men, but not for women engaged in the same 
work, resulted in discrimination identified solely by the criteria established by article II 9. Id. The 
inequality lay not in the pay itself, which after deductions was roughly equal, but rather in the financial 
benefits men received because of their higher gross pay. Id. 
161. Crishman, supra note 155, at 607. 
162. Worringham, [1981] I.C.R. at 568. This is consistent with Advocate-General Dutheillet de 
Lamothe's opinion in Defrenne v. Belgium State that purely private plans are covered by article 119 since 
they constitute a form of remuneration. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. See Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 20 (discussion of Advocate-General Warner's remarks in 
Worringham). 
165. Worringham, [1981] I.C.R. at 568. 
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contracted-out plans, then the plan should be beyond the scope of Article 119. 165 
Advocate-General Warner also suggested that even if Article 119 did apply to 
rights and benefits created by Lloyds' scheme, it cannot be directly effective in the 
member states because of the difficulty of applying the concept of equality to 
these schemes. l66 Because of the broad language of Article 119, a court cannot 
decide problems such as the effect of different retirement ages on equality in 
pensions or whether maternity leave should be pensionable without further 
legislation. 167 While the Court of Justice thus failed to decide whether Article 119 
was directly applicable to private pension schemes, the English courts have 
continued to uphold the validity of the retirement benefits exception. 
3. The English Court's Interpretation of The Pension Benefit Exclusion 
Several plaintiffs have challenged the pension benefits exclusion in both the 
Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act. 168 In three cases heard to-
gether,169 the Court of Appeal broadly interpreted the clause "provision in 
relation to death or retirement" in Section 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act to 
mean any provision about death or retirement. 170 In Roberts v. Cleveland, the 
court using this interpretation found that the age of retirement is a provision "in 
relation to retirement" and, therefore, the plaintiff could not complain about 
being dismissed after age sixty.171 
Under the Redundancy Payments Act of 1965 a woman employee can be 
dismissed without compensation after age sixty ifher dismissal arises because her 
job has become redundant while her male counterpart cannot be dismissed 
without compensation until age sixty. 172 The court stated that the law reflects the 
166. ld. at 569. See Note, Pensions and European Law, note 121, at 361 (discussing the problems of 
applying article 119 or the directives directly to pension plans). 
The court, however, rejected the defendant's request to limit the temporal effect of this judgment, as 
had been done in Defrenne v. Belgium State.ld. at 970-71. The court used the phrase "temporal effect" as 
a term of art, meaning a judgment prospective in nature only. In Defrenne v. Sabena, one lower court 
found that member states had not realized that article 119 was directly effective, nor had the European 
Commission taken steps to enforce this provision. Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] I.C.R. at 571. The 
Womngham court found that the criteria for ajudgment limiting the temporal effect was lacking in this 
case and refused to limit the judgment. Worringham, [1981) 1 W.L.R. at 970. See Note, Pensions and 
European Law, supra note 121, at 359-60, for a review of the court's handling of the temporal effect issue 
in both cases. In Womngham, the Court of Appeal accepted the European court's decision and awarded 
the plaintiffs a sum equal to the amount of contributions that would have been paid for two years in 
their names had they been male. Womngham, (1982) 3 All E.R. 373-74. The Equal Pay Act, ch. 41, § 
2(5), as amended, establishes a two year limit on back pay awards. ld. 
167. Womngham, [1981)I.C.R. at 569. 
168. Roberts v. Cleveland, [1979)I.C.R. 558 (Cl. App.). 
169.ld. 
170. Roberts v. Cleveland, [l979)I.C.R. at 564. 
171. ld. 
172. Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, ch. 62, § 2(1). An employer must make redundancy payments 
to any employee, other than male employees over 65 years old and female employees over 60 years old, 
who is dismissed because of redundancy. The Act defines redundancy as follows: 
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fact a woman employee is entitled to her pension after age sixty, and a male 
employee must wait until age sixty-five. 173 The court then applied the same 
reasoning in MacGregor Wallcover Ltd. v. Turten,174 in which the employer pro-
vided redundancy payments for men, but not for women between the ages of 
sixty and sixty-five. 175 The plaintiff complained of discrimination because she 
could never be eligible for this payment after age sixty. 176 The court held that the 
fact that she is not entitled to a payment because of an earlier retirement age is 
permissible discrimination under the section 6(4) exception. 177 
The Court of Appeal relied on section 6(4) in Garland v. British Rail Engineering 
Ltd. 178 to dismiss a charge of discrimination brought by a retired female worker 
of British Rail. 179 While working for the railroad, the plaintiff and her family 
received the same concessionary travel benefits as her male counterparts. Upon 
retirement, the families of retired male workers continued to receive those travel 
benefits, whereas the plaintiff's family did not. 180 Speaking through Lord Den-
ning, the court held that those travel rights were not a continuation of employ-
ment benefits, but rather a provision related to retirement, and that section 6(4) 
permits this type of discrimination. 181 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal subsequently adopted the decision that 
section 6(4) referred to any provision relating to death or retirement benefits. 182 
Parliament's intent in section 6(4) can be achieved only if that provision is read to 
For the purposes of this Act any employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by 
reason of redundancy if the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to (a) the fact that his 
employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the 
employee was employed by him, or has ceased, or intends to cease, to carryon that business in 
the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that 
business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry out 
work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed, have ceased or diminished or 
are expected to cease or diminish. 
§ 2(1). See also Roberts v. Cleveland, [1979] l.C.R. at 564. 
173. [1979]l.C.R. at 564. 
174. MacGregor WaUcoverings Ltd. v. Turten, [l979]l.C.R. at 566. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. at 566. 
178. [1979] l.C.R. at 564. 
179. [d. at 565. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. The Court of Justice held, however, that article 119 prohibits such discrimination in benefits. 
See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text. 
182. Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, [1983]l.C.R. at 528. This discussion involves two cases with similar facts. 
In the first, the employer, who was forced to make certain employees redundant, offered early 
retirement to all employees who had reached age 55. Ms. Roberts was 53 at the time and complained 
that since she was within ten years of retirement, as was a man age 55 who was offered retirement, she 
should have been offered it as well. [d. at 524. In the second case, the employer offered early retirement 
to those within ten years of the normal retiring age, which was 50 for women and 55 for men. Mr. 
Barber argued that he was discriminated against because at age 52 he was not able to retire, but a 
woman of the same age was able to do so. [d. Both cases were dismissed on the ground that the 
discrimination in question was excluded under § 6(4) as a provision related to retirement. [d. at 529, 
533. 
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exclude any complaint based on the existence of contractual terms relating to 
retirement. 183 According to the tribunal, while Parliament intended to eliminate 
all discrimination with the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act, it was faced 
with widespread discrimination regarding different retirement ages for men and 
women. 184 The court further stated that this discrimination existed in both state 
and private pension plans. 185 Rather than eliminate this difference, Parliament 
found it necessary to exclude any claim based on contractual terms relating to 
retirement because those terms would be linked to retirement ages. 186 As a result, 
section 6(4) covers not only benefits received from a retirement plan, but also the 
"terms of access to such benefits and the circumstances under which the benefit is 
payable." 187 
After examining the parliamentary intent, the tribunal found the appropriate 
test for whether section 6(4) applied was to determine whether the action 
involved was part of the employer's system of providing for retirement or was 
merely a privilege of employment that is continued after retirement. 188 Applying 
this test, the tribunal held that the terms in question, the age at which redun-
dancy and immediate pensions are offered, were terms relating to retirement. 189 
While accepting plaintiff's contention that the severance terms were made be-
cause of redundancy, the tribunal nevertheless held that the use of these terms, 
namely different retirement ages, resulted in discriminatory application of the 
pension schemes. 190 Section 6(4), therefore, operated to exclude plaintiff's claim 
under the Sex Discrimination Act. 191 With the national legislation excluding 
retirement schemes from protection against discrimination, plaintiffs turned to 
Community law. 192 
4. The Court of Justice Applies EEC Law to English Pension Plans 
The plaintiff in Garland appealed her case to the House of Lords, where the 
applicability of Article 119, the Equal Pay Directive and the Equal Treatment 
Directive was raised. 193 Receiving the case from the House of Lords, 194 the Court 
183. !d. at 529. 
184. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 82(1) states as follows: "Retirement includes retirement 
(whether voluntary or not) on grounds of age, length of service or incapacity." !d. See Roberts v. Tate & 
Lyle, [1983] I.C.R. at 528-29, 889 PARL. DEB., supra note 10, at 511; 905 PARL. DEB., supra note 20, at 546. 
185. Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, [1983] I.C.R. at 529. 
186. [d. 
187. Id. 
188. [d. at 528. This test was first articulated in Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1978] 
I.C.R. 495, 498-99 [E.A.T.] 
189. Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, [1983] I.C.R. at 591. 
190. Id. 
191. !d. 
192. See, e.g., id. at 530. 
193. Garland, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 542. 
194. Id. 
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of Justice held that Article 119 covers both cash and in kind benefits, whether 
provided for presently or in the future. 195 Because travel benefits were bestowed 
on all employees during the employment years, the court found that granting 
such concessionary travel after retirement was an extension of the conditions of 
employment. 196 This constituted pay within the meaning of Article 119 HJ7 and, 
therefore, the employer could not discriminate against women in providing this 
privilege. 19" The House of Lords, in accepting this decision, agreed that the 
section 6(4) exception does not apply to privileges that existed during employ-
ment and are continued after retirement, thus modifying the Court of Appeal's 
interpretation of section 6(4). 
Once again, the Court of Justice did not consider either the Equal Payor Equal 
Treatment Directives in making its findings. 199 It repeated its holdings from 
prior cases"OO that Article 119 is directly applicable to member states when, as 
here, discrimination can be identified solely with the criteria stated in Article 
119.'101 The court's holding is consistent with Advocate-General Thermatt's opin-
ion in this case"O" that enabling legislation is not always necessary to identify 
discrimination in retirement benefits. "03 As the court observed in Garland, not all 
benefits are calculated on the basis of retirement ages and life expectancies in 
determining the cost of those benefits.204 Here, differences in benefits existed 
regardless of the employee's age at the time of retiremenL 205 
The Garland decision can be distinguished from Burton v. British Railways 
Board, "06 in which no discrimination was found on the basis of access to retire-
ment benefits."07 Burton, an employee of British Rail, argued that he was dis-
criminated against because female employees of his age were offered voluntary 
redundancy several years before he was eligible.20~ The European Court of 
Justice, to whom the Employment Appeal Tribunal referred the matter, found 
that this case involved the question of whether access to benefits was discrimina-
195. Garland, [1982) 2 All E.R. 402, 412. 
196. !d. 
197. /d. This is true regardless of the legal nature of the benefit, which in this case does not arise out 
of a contractual obligation. The important issue is whether the benefits are granted as a part of the 
employment. !d. 
198. !d. 
199. /d. at 416. Garland, [1982) 2 All E.R. at 412. 
200. Defrenne v. Sabena, (1976) I.C.R. al 568; McCarthy's Ltd. v. Smith, (1980) I.C.R. 672, 690 
[E.C.].); Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., (1981)I.C.R. 592,613-14 [E.C.].). 
201. Snaith, supra note 66, at 301. 
202. Garland, (1982) 2 All E.R. at 409-11. 
203. Snaith, supra note 66, at 302. 
204. /d. 
205. !d. 
206. Burton v. British Railways Board, (1982) I Q.B. 1080, (1982) 3 All E.R. 537. 
207. (1982) 3 All E.R. at 530. 
208. !d. at 548-49. Women employees were eligible for voluntary redundancy benefits at age 55 
whereas men were required to wait until age 60. Mr. Burton was 58 at the commencement of the 
proceedings. /d. at 548. 
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tory, thereby falling under the terms of the Equal Treatment Directive and not 
Article 119 or the Equal Pay Directive. 209 The court construed the word "dismis-
sal" in Article 5( 1) of the Equal Treatment Directive to include termination of 
employment when it is part of a voluntary redundancy scheme.21O 
The court went on to note, however, that the challenged scheme is closely 
linked to the state's retirement system through the Redundancy Payment Act of 
1965, which regulates the dismissal of employees. 211 Because benefits are calcu-
lated in the same manner for both men and women, the court found the only 
difference in treatment arises from different retirement ages as established by 
the Social Security Act of 1973.212 Given this close link with the national retire-
ment system, the court found that it was not discriminatory under the Equal 
Treatment Directive for British Rail to maintain different access requirements to 
voluntary redundancy for men and women. 213 
In applying the Equal Treatment Directive to Burton, the Court of Justice 
modified the terms of the Directive by applying Article 7 of the Social Security 
Directive. 214 The Equal Treatment Directive prohibits discrimination in access to 
benefits and working conditions, including dismissal. 215 It does not mention any 
exception for differences based on different retirement ages. 216 In addition, the 
Equal Treatment Directive expressly excludes social security schemes from its 
coverage. 217 The court held, however, that since the Social Security Directive 
permits nations to have different retirement ages for men and women, and the 
plan in question was closely linked to the state system, there was no discrimina-
tion under EEC laws. 218 Because it held that EEC law did not apply in Burton, the 
court did not need to reach the issue of the applicability of Article 119 or the 
directives to pension plans. 219 Thus, the conflict between the EEC's stated policy 
of equal treatment for all workers, on the one hand, and the discriminatory 
nature of occupational pension plans, on the other, continues despite two recent 
209. /d. at 549. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
210. /d. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 36, art. 5(1) states, "Application of the principle of 
equal treatment with regard to working conditions, including the conditions governing dismissal, means 
that men and women shall be guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on the grounds of 
sex." /d. 
211. Burton, [1982] 3 All E.R. at 580. See Snaith, supra note 66, at 302. 
212. Burton, [1982] 3 All E.R. at 550. 
213. [d. 
214. Snaith, supra note 66, at 303. The Social Security Directive is aimed at implementing the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in the area of state social security. Social Security 
Directive, supra note 4, at art. 11. It excludes, however, coverage of pensionable wages for men and 
women. /d. at art. 7. 
215. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 36, at arts. 4 & 5. 
216. /d. 
217. [d. at art. 2. 
218. Snaith, supra note 66, at 302. The court reached this holding despite the fact that the Social 
Security Directive would not become effective until 1984. /d. 
219. [d. at 303. 
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opportunities for the Employment Appeal Tribunal to apply EEC law and 
policies. 
5. Recent Employment Appeal Tribunal Interpretations of EEC Law 
English courts continue to hold that neither English nor EEC law requires 
them to apply equality principles to retirement benefits. Following this approach, 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal recently affirmed earlier court decisions 
broadly interpreting Section 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act. 220 In South-
ampton v. Marshall, the plaintiff was forced to retire at age sixty-two even though 
she was willing and able to work until sixty-five, which was the retirement age for 
men. 221 The court held that because of Section 6(4), it was permissible for an 
employer to maintain different retirement ages. 222 After denying relief for the 
plaintiff under Section 6(4), the Southampton tribunal asked whether anything in 
European Community law preempts English law. 223 The tribunal found that 
Section 6(4) conflicts with Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive. 224 In 
addition, the tribunal stated that the English government had not yet taken any 
measures to implement that Directive. 225 Neither the House of Lords nor the 
Court of Justice, however, has held that a Directive is directly effective in 
member states. 226 The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that until either body 
says that a Directive is paramount, English law controls. 227 The Court could not 
find any authority in either English or EEC law overriding Section 6(4).228 The 
unanimous Tribunal did say that if the Equal Treatment Directive is found to be 
directly applicable to the member states, then the policy of retiring women 
220. Southampton and Southwest Hampshire Health Authority (Teaching) v. Marshall, [1983] 
l.R.L.R. 237 [E.A.T.] (available Jan. I, 1985, on Lexis, Enggen library, case file); Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, 
[1983]l.C.R. 521 [E.A.T.]. 
221. Southamption, supra note 220. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. 
224. [d. Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive adopts the principle that equal treatment 
requires that men and women be guaranteed the same conditions of employment, including dismissal 
from employment. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 36, at art. 5(1). 
225. Southampton, supra note 220. 
226. [d. The Court rejected the argument that Lord Denning's opinion in E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. 
v. Shields, [1975]l.R.L.R. 263 (i.e., that a Directive may have direct binding effect) was controlling. The 
Court stated that Lord Denning's opinion was not a decisive part of that judgment and therefore not 
controlling. In addition, Lord Justice Bridges suggested in the same opinion that Directives need 
national legislation in order to be implemented. [d. 
227. [d. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for treatment of the applicability of EEC law in 
Member States. 
228. Southampton, supra note 220. The Court rejected the Health Authority's argument that the 
Court of Justice'S decision in Burton should also be applied to occupational pension plans. [d. Rather, the 
Court interpreted the Burton decision as limited to the question of access to retirement benefits at 
different ages in the context of social security. The Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the Court 
of Justice has not yet ruled on whether a practice is discrimatory, which prevents a woman from 
working and is to her detriment. [d. 
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earlier than men conflicts with the principle of equality stated in Article 5(1) of 
the Equal Treatment Directive. 229 
Even if Article 119 or any of the Directives were found to be directly effective, 
the EEC law is itself unsettled. 230 As the Employment Appeal Tribunal pointed 
out in Barber v. Guardian the law is not clear as to access to retirement benefits. 23 ) 
Although actual benefits may be paid within the meaning of Article 119, the 
Burton court held that the issue of when a person is entitled to benefits is a 
question of access to benefits, which is covered by the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive. 232 The Barber court read the Burton decision as limited to a situation where 
rights are linked to a national retirement scheme governed by national social 
security provisions. 233 Furthermore, while several Advocates-General have sug-
gested that Article 119 would be applicable to a strictly occupational pension 
plan,234 the Court of Justice has not actually held that nor has it dealt with 
pensions linked to the state system via a contracting-out provision. In addition, 
EEC law is not clear on how the principle that different age conditions for men 
and women must be non-discriminatory applies to contracted-out pension 
plans. 235 When EEC law becomes clear, the English courts have said they will 
construe English law to conform with it. 236 
Article 119 has not been held to apply to rights and benefits of occupational 
pension plans. The difficulty in defining equality in retirement schemes, particu-
larly with the allowable differences in retirement ages between men and women, 
probably precludes the direct application of Article 119 to occupational pension 
plans.m In addition, the Court of Justice has held that the Equal Treatment 
Directive permits different requirements for men and women for access to 
retirement benefits when those benefits are closely linked to the state social 
security system. Critics argue that further legislation will be needed, either by the 
EEC or the English Parliament, before equality will be attained in pension 
benefits.23s 
There is a basic conflict in present English law. Both England and the EEC 
have adopted the principle of equality in employment. Yet this principle has not 
been applied to retirement benefits, which are arguably a different form of 
compensation. The U.S. courts have faced this problem and resolved it. The U.S. 
229. Id. 
230. Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, [1983] I.C.R. at 530. 
231. /d. 
232. Burton, [1982] 3 All E.R. 531. 
233. Roberts v. Tate & l.yle, [1983] I.C.R. at 530. 
234. Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe, DeJrenne v. Belgium State, COMMON MKT. REP. ~ 8137 
at 7575; Advocate-General Warner, Woningham, [1981] r.C.R. at 568. 
235. Roberts v. Tate & Lyle, [1983] r.C.R. at 530. 
236. See, e.g., Southampton, supra note 220. 
237. Note, Pensions and European Law, supra note 121, at 361. 
238. Id. 
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Supreme Court has held that discrimination in pension benefits IS inconsistent 
with equality of men and women in employment. 239 
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Insurance Industry and Pension Plans 
Predictions about longevity are a necessary element in determining the costs 
for and benefits from retirement plans making monthly annuity payments. 
Statistics have shown that, as a group, women live longer than men. 240 As a result, 
the insurance industry in the United States has traditionally used gender-based 
mortality tables 24 ! to predict the period over which pension benefits will be 
paid. 242 Because women on the average will receive benefits for a longer period 
of time, their annuity will yield lower monthly payments. 243 The insurance 
industry justifies the use of different mortality tables for men and women on the 
ground that the different tables are actuarially sound. 244 The purpose is to create 
homogeneous groups in which all members have equal risk. 245 Differences based 
on sex, however, do not necessarily create homogeneous groups.246 While strong 
statistical evidence shows that women live longer than men, sex is not the only 
239. See, e.K., Los Angeles v. Manhart, 438 U.S. 702 (1978). 
240. Ryan & Burkley, Non-discrimination in Pension Plans, 34 LAB. L.J. 201, 203-04 (1982). 
241. Mortality tables utilize past mortality rates for different age and sex groups in order to show the 
probability of death or survival at each age level. Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of Los 
Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV. W.L.J. I, 10 (1979). 
242. Ryan & Burkley, supra note 240, at 203-04. Retirement income generated from employer-
sponsored pension plans may be received in one of three ways: a single life annuity (which provides for 
periodic payments for the life of the individual), a joint and survivor annuity (like the single life annuity 
but with provisions for benefits to continue during the life of the survivor), or a lump sum payment. Id. 
at 203. These can be provided by either a defined benefit or defined contribution plan. Id. Benefits from 
defined contribution plans depend upon the option selected and actuarial assumptions about life 
expectancy. Halperin & Gross, Sex Discrimination and Pensions: Are We Working Toward Unisex Tables?, 30 
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB., 221, 236-38 (May 1977).71% of the estimated 46,000 pension plans serving 
approximately 46 million persons are defined contribution plans. Ryan & Burkley, supra note 240, at 
203. 
243. Ryan & Burkley, supra note 240, at 203. 
244. Halperin & Gross, supra note 242, at 245. Some insurance companies use a set-back system 
instead of mortality tables. For instance, a woman's age for purposes of calculating costs and benefits is 
considered seven years younger than a man's upon retirement. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & 
Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. 
CHI. L. R. 505, 506 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer I]. For a recent example of the Brilmayer 
group's ongoing argument with Professors Kimball and Benston, see, Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan, 
The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. R. 
222 (1983) (updated discussion of demographic evidence) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer II]. But cf. 
Benston, Discrimination and Economic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits: A Clarification of Issues and a 
Response to Professors Brilmayer, Laycock and Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 250 (1983) (use of sex-distinct 
mortality tables is not the result of invidious discrimination and, therefore, is properly utilized in 
distinguishing insurance risks). 
245. Halperin & Gross, supra note 242. at 241. 
246. [d. 
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characteristic that may explain this phenomenon. 247 It is not clear what role past 
organic and environmental factors play in creating greater longevity for 
women. 24~ Sex and age characteristics are used because they are visible, unam-
biguous, and unchangeable by the individual. 249 
Risk clarification in the pension industry is based on the idea that actuarial 
equity permits individual differences in risk to be considered whenever it is 
sufficiently supported by statistics. 250 This means that all persons with similar 
risks are classified together. 251 The practice of loss-spreading is also used in the 
insurance industry so that all persons, through their premiums, pay for the 
losses incurred by some. 252 The actuary must find a compromise between sharing 
the risk and subsidization, which occurs when people of varying risks are com-
bined into one group.253 It is up to the actuary to use his best judgment in 
determining which classifications may be used. 254 What may be actuarially sound, 
however,255 may be socially unacceptable. 256 Many argue that race and sex, are 
two characteristics which fall into this category.257 While the insurance industry 
deals with group classifications,25~ U.S. anti-discrimination legislation requires 
treating each person as an individual and not as a member of a class. 259 
B. Employment Discrimination Legislation 
The U.S. Congress, in 1964, passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibit-
ing discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 260 The Act applies to all employers, public and private, who 
employ fifteen or more persons. 261 The broad language of Title VII is limited by 
247. [d. See Brilmayer I, supra note 244, at 542-51 and Brilmayer II, supra note 244, at 236-47 
(actuarial mortality differences are not determined solely by biological factors); see also Key, supra note 
241, at 5-8 (sex is not an accurate predictor of longevity). But see Benston, supra note 244, at 271-73 (life 
expectancy is directly related to gender). 
248. Key, supra note 241, at 5. 
249. Halperin & Gross, supra note 242, at 246. 
250. Key, supra note 241, at 44. 
251. [d. 
252. Halperin & Gross, supra note 242, at 247. 
253. Key, supra note 241, at II. 
254. [d. at 44. 
255. [d. See Brilmayer I & II, supra note 244, for a contrary opinion. 
256. Key, supra note 241, at 44. 
257. [d. at 44-45. 
258. Ryan & Burkley, supra note 240, at 202. 
259. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. 
260. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(l) (1976 & Supp. II 1978), which states: 
It shall be an unlawful em ployment practice for an em ployer - (I) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
261. 42 U.s.C. § 2000e(b). The following are excluded from this requirement: The United States, a 
corporation wholly owned by the United States, an Indian tribe, any department of the District of 
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the Bennett Amendment, which states that a wage differential based on sex is not 
unlawful if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act of 1963.262 The Equal Pay Act, in 
turn, prohibits discrimination between men and women in compensation for 
work of equivalent value, unless the differential is based on one of the four 
specified exceptions. 263 That Act permits disparity in earnings for men and 
women when a differential arises as the result of a seniority system, merit system, 
or system which measures earnings on the basis of productivity.264 In addition, 
the Act exempts wage differentials based on any factor other than sex. 265 
At the time that Title VII was debated, Senator Humphrey, the floor manager 
of the Civil Rights Bill, stated that the Bennett Amendment would not alter 
existing industrial benefit plans, many of which treated men and women differ-
ently.266 The next interpretation of Title VII relating to pension plans came in 
the form of an administrative ruling. 267 In 1964, the Wage and Hour Adminis-
tration, which was charged with enforcing the Equal Pay Act, issued flexible 
guidelines for dealing with retirement plans. 268 The guidelines stated that an 
employer who either makes equal contribution to or provides equal benefits for 
similarly situated males and females fulfills the requirements of the Act. 269 In a 
separate ruling, however, the Wage and Hour Administration held that differ-
ences in wages for men and women justified on the basis of differences in the 
average cost of employing each group does not fall within the exceptions to Title 
VII and would, therefore, be a vIOlation of the Equal Pay Act. 270 The Equal 
Columbia subject by statute to the procedures of the competitive service, and a bona fide private 
membership club. [d. 
262. Section 703(h), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The Bennett Amendment, which became a 
part of Title VII, states: 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to differ-
entiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or 
to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions 
of section 4(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.s.C. § 206(d). 
263. See The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56,29 U.s.C. § 205(d) which states: 
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section shall discriminate ... on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees. No employer ... shall discriminate ... between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less 
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for 
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is 
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex; provided that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of 
this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the 
wage rate of any employees. 
264. [d. 
265. [d. 
266. 10 CONGo REC. 13,663-13,664 (1964). 
267. 279 C.F.R. § 800.116(d). See Sher, Sex Discrimination in Retirement Programs, 16 FORUM 1174, 1175 
(1980-81) (reviewing the administrative responses to discrimination in pension plans). 
268. Sher, supra note 267, at 1175. 
269. [d. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d». 
270. 29 C.F.R. § 800.151. The Wage and Hour Administrator explained that the sex factor alone 
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Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with the 
enforcement of Title VII, in its first set of guidelines in 1965,271 followed this 
approach. 272 
The EEOC issued new sex discrimination guidelines in 1972 requiring em-
ployers to provide similarly situated male and female workers with equal benefits 
from retirement programs. 273 The regulations specifically disallow the defense 
that the cost of providing benefits for one sex is greater than another. 274 In 1979, 
the EEOC was given the authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act as well as Title 
VII.275 The Commission then issued regulations on discrimination in fringe 
benefits, stating that it would be unlawful for a pension plan to differentiate on 
the basis of sex or to maintain different optional or compulsory retirement ages 
for men and women.276 It remained for the Supreme Court, however, to finally 
resolve the conflict among the executive agencies over whether Title VII re-
quires equality in private pension plans. 
may not justify a wage differential. If it were held otherwise, the wage differentials would perpetuate 
the discrimination sought to be eliminated. Id. 
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a), 5(a). See Rozmarin, Empluyment Discrimination Laws and Their Application, 
7 BARRISTER 29 (Spr. 1980) (outlining the primary laws dealing with employment discrimination). Any 
individual alleging employment discrimination must file a claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the 
alleged incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This not only guarantees the rights of individuals who file on 
time, but it also protects employers from liability which occurred in the past. Ann. Surv. of Lab. L., 24 
B.C.L. REv. 47, 221 (1982). The EEOC is required to seek conciliation and mediation regarding all 
charges filed with the Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I). If within thirty days after the charge is 
made the EEOC has been unsuccessful in its mediation efforts, then civil action may be brought. Id. 
Either the EEOC or the individual complainant may bring an action in federal district court, unless the 
respondent is a governmental body in which case the U.S. Attorney General alone has the authority to 
sue. Id. An individual has the right to intervene in any suit brought by the EEOC or the Attorney-
General on the individual's behalf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I). The district court has the authority to 
enjoin any unlawful practice, as well as to order reinstatement or the hiring of employees with or 
without back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay is limited, however, to the two years prior to the 
filing of the initial charge with the Commission. ld. 
272. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a), (b), (c) (1965). See Sher, supra note 267, at 1175-76 (discussing the 
administrative conflict over applying Title VII to pension plans). 
273. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b). 
274. ld. at § 1604.9(3). 
275. Congress gave the EEOC responsibility for enforcing the Equal Pay Act in Section 1 of 1978 
Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1978. See 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(1981). 
276. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) which states: "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory 
retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates on the basis of sex." This ruling is also consistent 
with certain legislative acts that prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. See, e.g. , the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act [hereinafter cited as ADEA], Pub. L. 990-202, § 2 etseq., 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. 
621 et seq. The ADEA parallels the terms of Title VII. Blackburn, Charting Cmnpliance Under The Age 
Discrimination in Empluyment Act, 57 CHICAGO - KENT L. REV. 559, 578-79 (1981). The ADEA prohibits 
discrimination against any persons between 40 and 70 by an employer of 20 or more persons, public or 
private. 29 U.S.C. at 623. Discrimination on the basis of bona fide occupation qualifications or bona fide 
employee benefit plans, however, is not prohibited. Id. 
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C. Manhart: Equal Contributions to Pension Plans 
The Supreme Court held in Los Angeles v. Manhart 277 that an employer violated 
Title VII when it required female employees to make larger contributions to a 
self-insured pension plan than male employees. 27H The employer in Manhart 
maintained a defined benefit plan, whereby men and women of the same age, 
seniority, and salary received equal monthly benefit upon retirement. 279 Based 
on its findings that women live longer than men, the employer determined that 
the cost of providing a pension to the average female retiree is greater than for 
her male colleague because, on the average, she will receive more monthly 
payments. 2HO The employer therefore required female employees to contribute 
14.84% more than male workers in order to receive the same monthly benefits. 281 
The Supreme Court held that Title VII unambiguously requires that all 
employees be treated as individuals and not simply as components of a class 
based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. 282 Although on the average 
women do live longer than men, anyone individual woman may not live as long 
as the average members of her class. 2H3 Thus, a generalization about a protected 
class, even if true, may not be used to discriminate against an individual. 2H4 The 
focus of the statute is fairness to individuals, not classes. 285 Therefore, while it 
may be unfair to require men as a class to subsidize women, it is not unlawful. 286 
Rather, the Court held, at least in defined benefit plans, it is unlawful to make 
individual women pay the cost of greater female longevity when it is not known 
that anyone of them will live longer than the average man. 2H7 
In Manhart, the employer had used separate mortality tables to calculate the 
cost of funding the program as well as the amount of benefit payments derived 
from contributions to the plan. 2HH These tables reflect the fact that a woman's life 
span is longer than a man's.289 Generalizations, however, often preserve tradi-
tional assumptions rather than help differentiate individuals from each other. 290 
As the Court pointed out, longevity may be the result of sociological and envi-
ronmental factors as well as biological ones. 291 The Court therefore held that 
277. 435 U.S. 702. 
278. [d. at 717. 






285. ld. at 709. 
286. [d. at 708-09. 
287. !d. at 708. See Key, supra note 241, at 16 (use of mortality tables by gender in pension plans). 
288. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705. See supra note 241 for a discussion of mortality tables. 
289. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705. 
290. !d. at 709. 
291. [d. See Brilmayer I, supra note 244, at 547 (discussion of the various factors attributed to the 
longevity differential found to exist between men and women). 
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mortality tables may not be used to require higher contributions from women in 
order to fund the plan. 292 
The holding of the Manhart Court comports with the generally accepted 
principle of the insurance industry that risks should be spread among the group 
of insured so that all premiums pay for those who suffer losses. 293 This principle 
is consistent with the Court's holding that Title VII focuses on the individual 
rather than on the individual's gender. 294 For instance, smokers subsidize health 
benefits for non-smokers.295 Likewise, men ought to subsidize pension benefits 
for women. 296 It is a common practice for different classes of risks to be grouped 
together for the purposes of insurance. It is no less unfair to men for this 
industry practice to be applied to pension plans. 
The Manhart Court found that the employer'S practice of requiring larger 
contributions from women treats women differently because of their sex. 297 
While this constitutes employment discrimination, the employer argued that it 
was exempted by the fourth exception to the Equal Pay Act, which allows wage 
differentials based on any factor other than sex. 298 The Court held that the Equal 
Pay Act does not protect the employer in this case from liability under Title VII 
because the actuarial data based on sex, which was used to discriminate against 
women, is not a factor other than sex. 299 Rather, "[s]ex is exactly what it is based 
on."300 Sex is only one factor in determining a person's longevity; no evidence 
was offered that any other factor was considered. 301 
The Court also rejected the defendant's reliance on Senator Humphrey's 
statement that Title VII does not apply to industrial pension plans. 302 The plain 
language of the statute, adopted a year before Senator Humphrey made his 
remarks, contradicts that interpretation. 303 Finally, the Court rejected the em-
ployer'S argument that the difference in the cost of providing benefits for each 
292. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710-11. See Key, supra note 241, at 16. The Court stated, however, that 
mortality tables and the composition of an employer's work force can be used in determining the 
probable cost of the death or retirement plan to the employer. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718. 
293. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710. See Halperin & Gross, supra note 242, at 241. 
294. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710. 
295. !d. at 710. 
296. !d. at 708-09. 
297. Id. at 711. 
298. !d. See supra note 263 (quoting the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act). The Court did not have to 
reach the issue of whether retirement benefits or contributions to a pension plan are wages because the 
Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(h), extended the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), to 
include all forms of compensation. 
299. !d. at 712. See Canter, Legislative and Judicial Devel"Pments in Pension Plans, 17 FORUM 166, 177 
(1981-1982). 
300. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 713 (citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case). 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
301. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712. See Brilmayer I, supra note 244, at 530 (the authors state that sex is 
irrelevant to longevity because it is not an accurate predictor of longevity). 
302. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 714. 
303. !d. 
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sex rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie showing of discrimination. 304 Congress did 
not write an affirmative defense of cost-justification into Title VII and the Court 
declined to imply one. 305 
The Court limited its decision in Manhart to the issue of equalizing contribu-
tions to pension plans by men and women in order that they may receive equal 
benefits. 306 It left open the question whether Title VII also requires equal 
benefits from a defined contribution plan. The Supreme Court answered this 
question five years later in Arizona v. Norris. 307 
D. Title VII and Pension Plan Benefits 
In the Norris case, the state of Arizona had offered its employees the option of 
participating in a deferred compensation plan under which they could receive a 
portion of their wages upon retirement. 308 This plan, which was administered by 
several private insurers, offered three options for the employee upon retire-
ment: a lump sum payment, periodic payments for a fixed time, or a monthly 
annuity for the remainder of the employee's life. 309 The monthly annuity was 
calculated on the basis of the amount of compensation the employee deferred, 
the employee's age at retirement, and the employee's sex. 310 All of the insurers 
involved used sex-based mortality tables in calculating the monthly benefits. 311 
No other factor was used in predicting the longevity of retirees.312 
Nathalie Norris, an employee and participant in the plan, brought a class 
action alleging that the employer violated Title VII by administering an annuity 
plan that discriminated on the basis of sex. 313 The Supreme Court, affirmed the 
Ninth Circuit's finding of discrimination,314 and held that sex-based mortality 
tables could not be used to determine retirement benefits when those tables 
generated different monthly payments for men and women. 315 Participation in a 
deferred retirement plan constitutes a condition of employment which results in 
compensation in the form of retirement benefits. 316 The Court held that because 
304. Id. at 716. 
305. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17. 
306. Id. 
307. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3493. 
308. Id. at 3494. 
309. /d. 
310. Id. at 3495. 
311. /d. at 3494-95. 
312. /d. at 3495. 
313. /d. 
314. Norris, 671 F.2d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1982). 
315. /d. at 3499. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor, wrote 
the majority opinion on the substantive issue of discrimination. Justice Powell was joined by Chief 
Justice Burger, and Justices B1ackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor on the decision to grant prospective 
relief only. 
316. Id. at 3496. 
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Title VII requires employees to be treated as individuals, the use of sex to 
predict the longevity of women or men as a class is inconsistent with its holding in 
Manhart. 317 
The use of sex-based mortality tables treats individual women differently from 
individual men because the only means of differentiation is on the basis of sex. 31H 
This is true despite the fact that at the time of retirement, the annuity policies 
would be actuarially equivalent. 319 The Court accepted without discussion the 
employer's argument that annuity policies for similarly situated men and women 
will have roughly the same present actuarial value because the lower monthly 
payments a woman is promised is offset by the likelihood that she will receive 
more payments.3~O Nonetheless, the Court, relying on its decision in Manhart, 
stated that class-based treatment, whether at the pay-in or pay-out stage, violates 
Title VII's proscriptions against classifications based on sexYI 
The Court in Norris responded to several questions left unanswered by its 
decision in Manhart. The employer argued that since their plan, unlike the one in 
the Manhart case, was a voluntary one, Title VII did not apply.3~~ Title VII, 
however, forbids discrimination in all terms and compensation. 323 The Norris 
court held that this applies to any term whether or not such terms are volun-
tary.324 A similar question arose regarding the fact that the plan in Norris offered 
two non-discriminatory options. 3~5 Both the lump-sum payment and the fixed 
periodic payment provide equal benefits to men and women who contribute the 
same amount of money.326 The Court held it is no defense to a discrimination 
charge that the employer also offers non-discriminatory fringe benefits. 327 
The Court also addressed the issue of whether the employer could be held 
317. Id. at 3496-98. 
318. Id. at 3498. As the Second Circuit pointed out in Spirt v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 
F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1982), a woman under a plan similar to the one in Norris is kept at a lower 
economic level than her male counterpart for the length of her retirement years in the same way that a 
woman in Manhart received lower wages than a man. Spirt, 691 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1982). See Note, 
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. I, 252, 254 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, The 
Supreme Court] (neutral statistics do not justify discriminatory policies). This is true regardless of the 
accuracy of the tables in predicting longevity. 
319. Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497. An actuarially equivalent plan is one in which beneficiaries receive 
payments based on their actuarial life expectancies. While all participants theoretically receive the same 
total dollar amounts, the benefits are paid out over different lengths of time to reflect the fact that men 
live longer than women. 
320. Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497 n.ll. Justice Marshall, in describing annuity policies, stated that: "The 
present actuarial value of an annuity policy is determined by multiplying the present value (in this case, 
the value at the time of the employee's retirement) of each monthly payment promised by the 
probability, which is supplied by an actuarial table, that the annuitant will live to receive that payment." 
Id. 
321. !d. 
322. Id. at 3497 n.IO. 
323. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(I). 
324. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3497 n.IO. 
325. Id. at 3500 n.17. 
326. !d. at 3497 n.IO. 
327. Id. at 3500 n.17. 
1985) SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION BENEFITS 463 
liable for the discriminatory practices of a third party, here, the insurance 
company.3~" The employer in Norris relied upon the Court's earlier statement in 
Manhart that an employer may lawfully set aside equal retirement contributions 
for each employee, which upon retirement can be used to purchase annuities on 
the open market. 3~9 The defendants maintained that because the annuities 
reflected what was available on the open market, they had not violated Title 
VII. 330 The Court rejected this argument because the employer created the plan, 
selected the insurance companies and contracted with them as to specific 
terms. 33l An employee choosing to participate in the plan had to use a company 
selected by the state. 33~ 
As a result of Norr~l, an employer may not escape liability because a fringe 
benefit scheme it adopts contains discriminatory features maintained by outside 
insurance companies. 33:! Further, the Court in Norris held that an employer 
cannot defend itself by claiming that it could not find an insurer who would treat 
employees equally under the law. 334 
The Supreme Court rulings in Manhart and Norris make it unacceptable under 
the terms of Title VII for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex in 
providing fringe benefits to its employees. 335 This is true whether the employer 
furnishes the pension plan336 or contracts it out;337 whether it is optional or 
compulsory;:!:l" and whether the employee as well as the employer contributes 
funds. 339 While the Supreme Court has dispelled any existing uncertainties as to 
the applicability of Title VII to pension benefits, the impact of the Court's 
decision is lessened by the prospective nature of the relief granted. 340 
E. Retroactive Relief: Manhart and Norris 
The Court held in both Manhart and Norris that the rulings were prospective 














at 3.<;0 I. 
333. Id. at 3502. Both parties to a contract are liable regardless of which one initiated inclusion of the 
discrinlinatory provision. Jd. 
334. Id. The COUrI expects employers to either find companies who will use neutral or integrated 
tables. suppl\' the benefits themselves, or not provide pension plans at all. Id. 
335. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702 (contributions); Norris, 103 S.Ct. 3493 (benefits). See also Newport News v. 
EEOC, 103 S.C!. 2022 (1983) (pregnancy benefits). Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 which supports these holdings 
by making it unlawful to have pension or retirement plans which establish different retirement ages 
based on sex. 
336. ManlulTt, 435 U.S. 702. 
337. Norris, 103 S.Ct. 3493. 
338. ld. 
339. ld. 
340. Id. at 3510. 
341. Manhart. 435 U.S. at 723; Norris. 103 S.C!. at 3512. 
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mandated by law. 342 The Court stated that retroactive relief should not be 
awarded when a new law is established, which would have a potentially disrup-
tive impact on the employer's practice. 343 In both Manhart and Norris, the ma-
jority of the Court held that the employers could have reasonably assumed that 
their employment practices were lawful and, therefore, could not have antici-
pated the change in law expounded by the Court. 344 
Risks that the insurer foresees will be included in the calculation of 
liability, and the rates or contributions charged will reflect that calcu-
lation. The occurrence of major unforeseen contingencies, however, 
jeopardizes the insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insured's be-
nefits. Drastic changes in the legal rules governing pension and 
insurance funds, like other unforeseen events, can have this effect. 
Consequently, the rules that apply to these funds should not be 
applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded 
that result. 345 
Prior to the Court's decision in Manhart the law regarding pension plans was 
unclear. 346 Pension administrators were faced with vague statutory language and 
inconsistent rulings from two administrative agencies. 347 The Court created new 
law with its decision. 34s In addition, the financial impact of retroactive relief on 
the large number of pension plans in the United States would have been devas-
tating, with the most harm falling on innocent third parties such as the be-
neficiaries of these plans. 349 The concern was that retroactive relief would re-
quire greater disbursements than had been originally planned, thus jeopardizing 
the solvency of these plans and the insureds' benefits. 350 
Justice Powell's opinion in Norris reiterated this reasoning. 35 ! The Court found 
342. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718-19. 
343. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510. 
344. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720; Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3510. But see Justice Marshall's dissent in Norris at 
3501 stating that Manhart had given employers fair warning that discrimination in annuity schemes 
violated Title VII. 
345. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721. 
346. /d. at 720. 
347. [d. See note 270 and accompanying text. The Wage and Hour Administration required an 
employer to maintain equal contributions or benefits, while the EEOC required equal benefits. 
348. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722. The Court held that prior to this decision it was reasonable for 
employers to believe that it would be unfair to make men carry more than their "actuarial share" of the 
cost of these plans. [d. 
349. /d. at 722-23. If relief was awarded retroactively, the money to pay such an award would come 
from the pension funds. Diminishing the assets of the funds would possibly jeopardize their solvency, 
resulting in either the lowering of current mortality benefits to retirees or raising the contributions of 
current employees. [d. at 723. 
350. [d. at 721. See Note, The Supreme Court, supra note 319, at 257 n.40, which criticizes the Court's 
holding in Noms that substantial costs militate against retroactive relief. It also states that prospective 
relief diminishes the impact of the holding because it perpetuates the discriminatory treatment of 
women. [d. at 257-58. 
351. Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3510. 
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that the question of equality of benefits had not been decided by its earlier 
decision in Manhart. 352 Because Manhart expressly allowed employers to set aside 
contributions for later purchases of annuities on the open market, an employer 
could have reasonably believed that making such annuities available to its em-
ployees was lawful, and therefore the entire plan was acceptable. 353 In addition, 
retroactive relief would cause great economic disruption, with the largest burden 
carried by economically poor states. 354 The Court, therefore, held that only 
benefits based on contributions made from the date of judgment onward would 
have to be equal. 355 
The United States, mainly through the decisions of the Supreme Court, has 
resolved the issue of pension benefits in favor of full equality for men and 
women. England, on the other hand, has not followed the U.S. example. Mecha-
nisms for change, however, are available in the English system. Equality can be 
achieved either through changes in existing legislation, which is very similar to 
the U.S. statutory scheme, or through the efforts of the EEC and the European 
Court of Justice. 
IV. COMPARING U.S., ENGLISH, AND EEC LAW 
A. Title VII and The Sex Discrimination Act 
Both England and the United States ban discriminatory employment prac-
tices, whether blatant acts or facially neutral policies that have a discriminatory 
impact. 356 The two legislative acts are similar in their approach as well as their 
structure. 357 Both the U.S. Congress and the English Parliament created em-
352. /d. 
353. /d. 
354. [d. See supra note 348 on the effect of a retroactive award on the pension industry. 
355. Noms, 103 S.Ct. at 3510 n.12. Employers must insure that all benefits received from contribu-
tions made on or after August I, 1983 are calculated "without regard to the sex of the employee." [d. 
Justice O'Connor indicated that the Equal Pay Act, while prohibiting the lowering of compensation to 
comply with the law, would not necessarily require employers to "top-up" benefits (bringing women's 
benefit levels up to men's). Rather, employers could use tables reflecting the longevity of the employee 
population as a whole. [d. at 3512 n.4. See, e.g., Ryan & Burkley, supra note 240, at 204-07 (suggesting 
possible methods of implementing the changes now required by Norris). See also Halperin & Gross, supra 
note 242, at 252-56 (the problems of unisex tables). 
356. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41; and Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 
65. 
357. Title VII, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65. See Covington, supra note 
100, at 407-15 (the two statutory schemes are similarly drafted). While the British statute covers all 
employees, including trade unions, the U.S. statute is limited to employers of fifteen or more persons. 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 10. U.S. labor unions are only 
covered if they operate a hiring hall, have fifteen or more members, or act as bargaining representa-
tives. 42 U.s.C. § 2000e. 
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ployment opportunity commissions358 with similar enforcement respon-
sibilities.359 
The U.S. statute provides individuals with the opportunity to present their 
claims to the administrative agency.360 The employees also have the right to 
pursue their claims in federal district courts if they fail to receive satisfaction 
from the EEOC.36! The English act, on the other hand, provides that individuals 
may assert their claims directly before an industrial tribunal. 362 In both countries, 
individuals may receive assistance from the Commission. 363 
Both Title VII and the Sex Discrimination Act prohibit employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. 364 Both statutes also allow for a bona fide occupational 
qualification exclusion. 365 Section 7 of the English Act, unlike Title VII, gives a 
detailed description of what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification. 366 
While Title VII is broadly written so as to permit a "differential based on any ... 
factor other than sex," the English Act is limited to specified situations.367 
The statutes, however, differ in two material respects. First, the English statute 
allows employers to maintain different retirement ages for men and women.36H 
Not only is it permitted in occupational pension plans, but it also specifically 
prescribes a five year difference in pensionable ages for men and women qualify-
ing for state social security benefits.369 It follows from this, that pension benefits 
358. Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-4(g), creating the EEOC; and Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 65, 
§ 53, creating the Equal Opportunities Commission (UEOC"). 
359. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5 and 3-8; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 §§ 54-61, 74-75. Each Commis-
sion is authorized to conduct research and education; monitor employment discrimination, including 
reporting to the appropriate legislative body; participate in enforcement of the statute, by bringing suit 
on its own behalf or assisting individuals; and conduct investigations into employment discrimination. 
ld. 
360. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
361. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
362. Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 65, § 6. 
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 § 75. The EEOC is empowered to 
furnish technical assistance to persons bringing claims under Title VII as well as to assist in an 
individual's civil action through intervention in the proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3) and (6). 
Likewise, the EOC has the authority to assist individuals by giving advice, procuring advice, and 
arranging for representation. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 75(2). This includes financial 
assistance when necessary. 
364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 6(1). The British statute, in 
addition, narrowly prescribes different treatment on the basis of marriage. /d. at §§ 1(2),2(2),3(1) and 
3(2). See Covington, supra note 100, at 409, for a discussion of this section. 
365. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) and (h); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 7. A bona fide 
occupational qualification (UBFOQ") based on sex is one in which members of one sex cannot ade-
quately, safely, and efficiently perform the duties of the job involved. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). The EEOC agrees with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Weeks 
that the BFOQ exception should be construed narrowly. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2. The Commission sets out 
guidelines for interpreting the BFOQ exception in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2. 
366. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 7. 
367. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, § 7. 
368. Social Security Act, 1973, ch. 38, § 23. 
369. ld. 
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are inherently discriminatory since men and women can never receive the same 
benefits.370 Second, both the English Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination 
Act specifically exclude death or retirement benefits from their coverage.371 The 
result in England is that women are afforded no protection from discrimination 
in the receipt of pension benefits. 372 
The United States, on the other hand, has by legislative fiat prohibited age 
discrimination in employment.373 While the legislation does not specifically ad-
dress the issue, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII does apply to pension 
benefits.374 Further, it has ruled that the use of actuarial tables which discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex violates the employment discrimination act. 375 The EEOC 
has adopted this reasoning by enacting regulations which prohibit employers 
from maintaining pension schemes with different retirement ages for men and 
women.376 While England has not followed the United States in achieving equal-
ity of benefits for men and women, the EEC has made some efforts toward 
achieving this result. 
B. The Impact of the EEC on Pension Benefits in Englarul 
Because of its membership in the EEC, England must follow Community 
law. 377 In the context of employment compensation, this means member states 
must insure that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. 378 The Court 
of Justice has ruled that retirement benefits which are merely a continuation of 
benefits received during employment are considered pay within the meaning of 
Article 119.379 
The Court of Justice, however, has not yet decided the issue of whether the 
principles of equality must be applied to pension benefits.3so In addition, the 
European Council has affirmed the right of member states to maintain different 
retirement ages in providing for social security benefits.3S ! The Court of Justice 
370. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. Different benefits for men and women result 
because women do not work as many years as men and. therefore. do not make as many contributions. 
Ellis & Morrell. supra note 21. at 25-26. 
371. Equal Pay Act. 1970. ch. 41. § 6(1); Sex Discrimination Act. 1975. ch. 65. § 6(4). The latter act 
explicitly allows discriminatory treatment when that conduct is based on reliable actuarial data.ld. at § 
45. S •• supra note 123. 
372. Note. Pensums and Eump.an Law. supra note 121. at 357. S.e also supra text accompanying note 
121. 
373. ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623. 
374. See ••. g .• Manhart. 435 U.S. at 702. 
375. Norris. 103 S.Ct. at 3499. 
376. 9 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f). 
377. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
378. Treaty of Rome. supra note 26. at art. 119. Se. supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
379. Garland v. British Rail. [1982) 2 All E.R. at 412. 
380. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
381. This is true of both the Council and the Court of Justice. S ..... g .• Social Security Directive. supra 
note 4. at 382. Burton. [1982) 3 All E.R. at 550. 
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has interpreted this right as applicable to private plans closely linked to the state 
system of redundancy. It is not clear how this decision will apply to con-
tracted-out private occupational pension plans. 382 
Given the economic status of England and the EEC, and the record number of 
women workers, fairness requires that the principle of equality eventually be 
applied to all forms of compensation, including retirement benefits. Parliament, 
however, is reluctant to alter the difference in retirement ages for men and 
women due to the expected increase in cost and the concern that implementing 
equality in pension benefits will cause many plans to go bankrupt. It seems likely, 
therefore, that the change will have to come from the EEC. If this happens 
through the Court of Justice, the court will then have to decide the issue of 
prospective or retroactive relief. 
The United States Supreme Court in Manhart and Norris applied relief pros-
pectively because the court was creating new law which employers could not have 
anticipated. In addition, the economic consequences were such that the court felt 
retroactive relief would cause devastating results and undue hardship.383 If the 
English Parliament does not act, and the European Court of Justice finds that 
Community law requires equality, then that Court should apply the U.S. exam-
ple to the English situation. Applying the U.S. example to English or EEC law is 
not a novel idea; the European Court did just that in Defrenne v. Sabena. 384 In an 
effort not to interfere with the economy of the member states,385 the:: Court in 
DeJrenne limited the effects of its holding to claims arising over pay periods 
beginning after the judgment. 386 The Court ruled prospectively because 
Member States had not realized that Article 119 was directly applicable without 
further legislation and the Commission itself had not taken any measures to 
enforce this provision. 387 In addition, the Court found that it would be very 
difficult to ascertain with certainty what the pay should have been in both public 
and private markets, thereby making it impossible to decide cases arising from 
the past. 388 
382. See, e.g., Southampton, supra note 220. 
383. See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text. 
384. [1976) I.C.R. at 571. 
385. Szyszczak, Problems of Equal Pay Within the EEC Perspective, 131 NEW LAW J. 39,40 Uan. 8,1981) 
386. Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976) I.C.R. at 571. Judgment was entered on April 8, 1976. The Court's 
prospective holding excludes, however, claims instituted by workers prior to April 8, 1976. 
387. Note, Equal Pay and Article 119, supra note 29, at 499 (referring to Defrenne v. Sabena). This is 
true despite the fact that in the original Treaty, article 119 stated that it was to be fully implemented by 
the end of the first stage, which was December 1961. 298 V.N.T.S. 3. 
388. Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976) I.C.R. at 571. The judgment also applied to new member states. The 
Commission had previously held that article 119 should have been fully applicable in new member 
states by January 1, 1973 (the date of accession). 1d. at 570. The European Court was not willing, 
however, to apply this innovative ruling to the case of Worringham v. Lloyds' Bank. Note, Pensions and 
European Law, supra note 121, at 359. That case was decided, however, after the scope of article 119 had 
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It is not clear whether occupational schemes are covered by either Article 119 
or the Equal Treatment Directive. 389 If the Court of Justice were to find that 
either Article 119 or the Equal Treatment Directive is directly applicable in the 
area of pension plans, it should consider applying its decision prospectively as it 
did in Defrenne v. Sabena. Neither the Commission nor the member states are 
certain that Community law requires equality within occupational pension 
plans.39o Further, the financial impact on employers and insurers if such a 
decision were issued retroactively would be considerable.391 By applying the 
decision prospectively, the Court would lessen the hardship imposed on employ-
ers who are uncertain as to the existing law, while at the same time implementing 
the principles of equality which have in theory been adopted by all members of 
the Community. 
While prospective relief does solve the problem of avoiding substantial, unan-
ticipated costs,392 it also frustrates the legislative purpose of eliminating all 
discriminatory practices. 393 Limiting victims of discrimination to prospective 
relief in effect leaves past discrimination uncompensated. 394 A similar problem 
exists for a court when ordering changes to an occupational pension plan which 
maintains different retirement ages. 395 If women retire earlier than men, then 
they can never accrue the same amount of benefits. On the other hand, if the 
court orders changes in order to achieve equality by raising the retirement age 
for one sex, it will have made a legislative decision that working longer for a 
greater pension is preferable to early retirement.396 Given these problems, the 
most effective means for achieving equality in pension plans in England will be 
through an act of Parliament, rather than a court decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Parliament enacted legislation in 1970 and 1975 which was designed to combat 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. It excluded retirement benefits, 
already been determined in Defrenne v. Sabena. Worringham, [1981]I.C.R. at 591. The Court held that 
the conditions found in Defrenne v. Sabena necessitating a prospective ruling did not exist in Worringham. 
[d. 
389. See, e.g., Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 20; McCallum & Snaith, supra note 62, at 270. 
390. McCallum & Snaith, supra note 62, at 268-69. In a consultative document on equal treatment for 
men and women in occupational pension schemes the British government stated that it did not view 
article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive, standing alone, as requiring equality in pension plans. [d. at 270. 
See also Note, Pensions and European Law, supra note 121, at 360. 
391. Note, Pensions and European Law. supra note 121, at 361. See also CMD. No. 6599, supra note 9, at 
52-56. 
392. Note, The Supreme Court, supra note 318, at 257. 
393. [d. 
394. [d. at 257-58. 
395. Ellis & Morrell, supra note 21, at 427. 
396. [d. 
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however, from the areas of employment covered by both the Equal Pay Act and 
the Sex Discrimination Act. The English courts have interpreted the pension 
benefits exceptions as excluding any employment provision relating to pensions. 
While somewhat more successful in the Court of Justice, plaintiffs have been 
unable to get that court to rule on whether private pension plans are covered by 
the equality requirements of EEC law. 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome requires member states to insure that men 
and women receive equal pay for equal work. The European Council has issued 
several directives interpreting and applying the principles stated in Article 119. 
In addition, the Court of Justice, through cases such as Worringham and Garland, 
has expanded the meaning of pay in EEC law. Neither the court nor the Council, 
however, has applied the equality principles to private pension benefits. It is still 
unclear whether employers are required to achieve equality for men and women 
in the occupational pension plans they maintain. 
By permitting inequality in pension benefits, England contravenes the princi-
ple of equal pay embodied in Article 119. The Court of Justice has held that pay 
within the meaning of Article 119 constitutes more than cash payment. In 
Garland, for instance, the court held that gratuitous travel privileges for workers, 
even after retirement, were pay. Pension benefits, like travel privileges, are 
remuneration for work, just a different form than wages. Changes will have to be 
made in either English anti-discrimination legislation or in EEC laws in order to 
correct these contradictory positions. 
The U.S. law, on the other hand, is clear and settled. Title VII prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics. Persons 
must be treated as individuals and not as members of a class based on race, color, 
nationality, religion, or sex. Based on the broad language of Title VII, the 
Supreme Court held that employers may not discriminate against women in 
providing retirement benefits. Employers must insure that contributions to and 
benefits from these plans are maintained equally for men and women. 
In making these decisions, the Supreme Court issued its ruling prospectively. 
By broadly interpreting Title VII, the Court changed the law regarding pension 
benefits. It was concerned that if the holding was applied retroactively, the 
solvency of many pension plans would be placed in jeopardy. Employers could 
not anticipate the change in law and, therefore, should not be penalized. 
The Court of Justice should, on the basis of Article 119 or one of the direc-
tives, decide that employers must achieve equality in occupational pension plans. 
The Court should also follow the U.S. example and make its ruling prospective 
in nature. The Court has issued prospective rulings in the past. In Defrenne v. 
Sabena, the Court held that Article 119 was directly applicable in Member States 
only after the date of that judgment. Because it would in effect be creating new 
law, the Court's decision would be less economically harsh if the decision to grant 
relief was made prospective. 
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